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DEPARTMENT STORES ON SALE:
AN ANTITRUST QUANDARY
Mark D. Bauer*
INTRODUCTION
Department stores occupy a unique role in American society. With
memories of trips to see Santa Claus, Christmas window displays,
holiday parades or Fourth of July fireworks, department stores-
particularly the old downtown stores-are often more likely to
engender civic pride than a city hall building or a courthouse.'
Department store companies have traditionally been among the
strongest contributors to local civic charities, such as museums or
symphonies. In many towns, the department store is the primary
downtown activity generator and an important focus of urban renewal
plans. The closing of a department store is generally considered a
devastating blow to a downtown, or even to a suburban shopping
mall.
Many people feel connected to and vested in their hometown
23department store. In 2005, Macy's,3 already the largest department
* Associate Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. A.B., The
University of Chicago; J.D., Emory University. The author was formerly an attorney with the Federal
Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice. This article was presented as a work in progress
at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools' annual conference, Indiana University School of Law -
Indianapolis, Mercer University School of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law, and the Annual
Meeting of the Canadian Law & Economics Association of the University of Toronto Law Faculty. The
author also gratefully acknowledges student research assistants Ryan McGee, Dana Dean, Marisa
Gonzalez, Mike Kincart, and Marc Levine, who all did background research. This article has benefited
from helpful critiques and suggestions from Jon Baker, Richard Benedikt, Darren Bush, and Janice
McClendon. Finally, this article was supported by Pamela Burdett, Wanita Scroggs, Julieanne Hartman
Stevens, and Sally Waters, Stetson's reference librarians; a generous research grant from Stetson
University College of Law; and the unfailing support of Dean Darby Dickerson and Associate Dean
Ellen Podgor.
1. See, e.g., Barbara Cloud, Department Stores Evoke Warm Memories, PrrrSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 4, 2006, at C3. See also Alan Lupo, When a Store Closes Its Doors, a Bit of the Past
Disappears, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 20, 1998, at 3.
2. Sandra Jones, Hoarding Names No Game: Federated Keeps Tight Grip on Dearly Departed
Department Stores to Protect Its Star Brand, CHI. TRIB., July 23, 2006, § 5, at 1.
3. In 2005, Macy's was an operating arm of Federated Department Stores (FDS). On February 27,
2007, FDS announced that it would seek shareholder approval to change its corporate name to Macy's
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store group in the United States, acquired May Department Stores, its
largest competitor, for $17 billion.4 The merger was closely
examined by federal antitrust authorities, but the regulators took no
action. 5 Although this industry was no stranger to mergers, name
changes, or reorganizations, nothing came close to Macy's dramatic
decision in 2005 to rename-and indeed, drastically alter-hundreds
of former May department stores to Macy's.6 Although each Marshall
Field's, Filene's, Hecht's, Strawbridge's, and Foley's store, among
others, had long since become part of a distant holding company,
shoppers in each separate city were able to participate in an unbroken
chain of tradition and memories that hearkened back to each stores'
local founder.
According to the doctrine of law and economics, however, none of
this really matters. 7 To a devotee of law and economics, antitrust is a
study of elasticity of demand, market power, and a concept called
"consumer welfare" that has little to do with lay definitions of the
Inc., recognizing that 90% of its sales come from Macy's (the other 10% coming from its other
department store chain, Bloomingdale's). Press Release, Federated Department Stores, Inc., Federated
Plans Corporate Name Change, Feb. 27, 2007, http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=84477&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=967632&highlight. That name change was
approved by stockholders and became effective June 1, 2007. Sandra Jones, Macy's: State St. Store
'Doing Badly': Official Says Greater Effort Needed to Get Traffic into Flagship, CHI. TRIB, May 19,
2007, at CI. The mixed lineage and nomenclature of the various entities discussed in this article can be
confusing because FDS and Macy's both had long independent histories before finally merging in 1993.
Although many of the events discussed occurred while Macy's was part of FDS, this article will only
refer to FDS when necessary for historical clarity, particularly relating to the period before 1994 when
FDS bought Macy's.
4. Brenon Daly, Federated, May to Tie Knot, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 1, 2005; David Moin, Evan Clark,
Vicki M. Young & Amy S. Choi, Federated-May Merger: With a Deal Imminent, Market Weighs
Fallout: Federated Department Stores and May Department Stores to Merge, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY,
Feb. 28, 2005, at 1.
5. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, FTC Ends Inquiry into Macy Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994, at 37;
Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May Department
Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at I (FTC 2005); see generally Federal Trade Commission,
Pre-Merger/Hart-Scott Rodino Act, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsr/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2008);
Federal Trade Commission, Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act,
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/01/P85991 ORevisedSection7AClaytonAct2007.pdf.
6. Jones, supra note 2, at 1.
7. Law and economics-often referred to as "the Chicago School"-boiled down to its most
simplistic description, would argue that "fa]ntitrust concerns should kick in only when a firm had a
dominant market share in a market protected by entry barriers, and entry itself could be relied upon to
solve most competitive problems, except when government action protected incumbents." Jonathan
Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST
ANALYSIS 60, 66 (2002).
[Vol. 26:2
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words "consumer" or "welfare. 8 To these scholars, department stores
are analogous to a basket of goods, or simply a retail channel
distributing products made by others and offering nothing substantive
of value to purchasers. 9 Were a department store to raise prices, law
and economics informs us that shoppers would make rational
economic decisions by flocking to less expensive sellers of similar
wares.
At odds with the predictions of the law and economics crew,
however, was the reaction of consumers to Macy's acquisition of
May, particularly in Chicago. Upon hearing of Macy's plan to change
the name of Marshall Field's, Chicago's iconic downtown anchor,
hundreds of Chicagoans took to the streets in protest.' 0 These
shoppers were not content to purchase similar or even identical goods
elsewhere. Even now, several years after the merger, fans of Marshall
Field's continue to protest at Macy's annual shareholders meeting.il
8. The term "consumer welfare" is confusing to some because it does not mean that the welfare of
the majority of consumers is maximized. STEPHEN F. Ross, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 3-4 (The
Foundation Press, Inc. 1993). Consumer welfare means maximization of societal wealth, not that of
individuals, which can simply mean there is more wealth, but it is concentrated among the already
wealthy. Id. Similarly, "allocative efficiency" does not mean "competition." Id. at 4. The Chicago
School usually focuses on short-term rather than long-term efficiencies. Id.
9. The concept of a collection of goods taking on a characteristic separate and apart from the
individual goods themselves has not received considerable attention from antitrust scholars. See
generally Jonathan B. Baker, Product Differentiation Through Space and Time: Some Antitrust Policy
Issues, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 177 (1997); Jonathan B. Baker, Unilateral Competitive Effects Theories in
Merger Analysis, 11 ANTITRUST 21-26 (Spring 1997); Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The
Gains from Merger or Collusion In Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 427 (1985);
Craig M. Newmark, Price Concentration Studies: There You Go Again 12,
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/docs/202603.htm (suggesting that consumers compare
prices on individual products but are actually interested in buying a package of bundled services); 1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41552, §§ 2.2-2.21 (Sept. 10, 1992). The Supreme Court
did, however, at least hint at this in one of the earliest merger cases. See United States v. Philadelphia
Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356-57 (1963).
10. Gail Heriot, Give the Lady What She Wants, WALL ST. J., June 17, 2006, at AI0; Rummana
Hussain, Protestors Wear Green, See Red: 200 Demonstrate on State As Field's Becomes Macy's, CHI.
SUN-TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, at A9. Slogans on the protestors signs included "Boycott Macy's, Field's is
Chicago," "Hell No, Not My Dough," and, thinking along similar lines as this author with regard to the
title of this article, "Give the Lady What She Wants and She Wants Marshall Field's." Hussain, at A9.
The Chicago Tribune in an editorial compared it to renaming Wrigley Field as Yankee Stadium.
Editorial, Farewell to Field's, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 21, 2005, at C26.
11. Sandra M. Jones, Field's Backers Take Beef to Macy's Annual Meeting, CHI. TRIB., May 24,
2008, at CI.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 257 2009-2010
)  T ARY 257 
er" .   
   
 t    
 t  
  
 i    
 
  i   
  f 
  ' s  
  
 IO  
   l  
.  
' ti  t  protest at acy's annual shareholders meeting. I I 
r r " i      
t  j it    i  i i .        
 i ti   t l ,   
i i i l ,        ,    trated    
ealthy. /d. i ilarl , "all cati e efficie cy" es t ea  " tition." Id. t .  i  
 l   i . d. 
.  t f  ll ti  f  t i    r t ri ti  r t   rt fr  t  
i i i l l es     
l   ct tiation h  t li y 
I ,  I  .  ( ); t  . r, il teral titi  ff t  ries i  
r   i       
 i   ct- if erentiated stries, ); 
 . , i e centration i s:    
tt :// . s j. /atr/ lic/ rkshops/docS/202603.htrn (s sti  t t s rs r  
ri s  i i i l r ts t r  t ll  i t r t  i  i    f l  i ;  
ri t l r r i li ,  . . ,  . .  t. , .   t 
t  l l hia 
'  ,  . . ,  ). 
. il ri t, i  t   t  t ,  . .,  ,2 , t ;  
t stors en, t te  l 's . 
I , ,2     tt   
,   ,      
titl  f t is rti l , i  t   t  ts   t  r ll i l 's." i , t . 
 i  ri  i   it ri l r  it t  r i  ri l  i l    t i . 
it i l, ll t  i ld's, I. i ., t. , , t . 
.  . , i l 's    ' I. i  
l  
3
Bauer: Department Stores on Sale:  An Antitrust Quandary
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
There is something important about department stores and antitrust
that is not captured in a conventional law and economics analysis.
Economic science does not lie, but law and economics may be
focusing on the wrong data. There may be a reason even within
conventional antitrust analysis to explain the cries of outraged
consumers. 12
Part I of this article will review the history of department stores
and examine their importance to American culture, particularly to the
development of the urban fabric. The literature and scholarship
focusing on this period amply chronicle the importance of department
stores to the development of cities, civic identity, and popular culture.
Indeed, antitrust arose in the same populist era as department stores,
and both share common origins and ideals of consumerism and
democracy. 1
3
Part II of this article will provide the background and necessary
context for the antitrust laws. Part III of this article will review the
United States Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) decision to permit
Macy's to acquire May. The conclusion of this article offers a
suggestion for remedial action.
I. HISTORY AND GROWTH OF DEPARTMENT STORES
A. The Relevance of Department Store History
Law and economics generally ignores retail. 14 "The most extreme
form of neglect is to act as though retailers do not even exist-as
12. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 709, 754-57 (2006); Herbert Simon, A Behavioral Model of
Rational Choice, in Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human
Behavior in a Social Setting, 69 THE Q. J. OF ECON. 99 (1955); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded
Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (Dec. 2003).
13. See Marc Winerman, The Origins of the FTC. Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and
Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 75-76, 90 (2003); 51 CONG. REC. 11228, 11105, 11109, 14936.
(1914) (statements of Sens. Robinson, Cummings, Newlands, and Rep. Stevens)); Neil W. Averitt, The
Meaning of "Unfair Acts of Practices'" in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J.
225,230-31 (1981).
14. See Robert L. Steiner, The Nature of Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 (1985)
[hereinafter Steiner, Vertical Restraints]; Pamela Jones Harbour, An Enforcement Perspective on the
Work of Robert L. Steiner: Why Retailing and Vertical Relationships Matter, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 985,
985-86, 992 (Winter 2004); Michael P. Lynch, Why Economists Are Wrong to Neglect Retailing and
[Vol. 26:2
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though manufacturers sell directly to consumers."' 5 But this segment
of the economy is just too big to ignore. In recent years, more than 20
million people worked in the distributive trades: 1.5 workers for
every worker in manufacturing. 16 Wal-Mart is not only a retailer
employing more than one million Americans-Wal-Mart is also one
of the two largest corporations in the world.' 7
Law and economics generally predicts that in the event of a
manufacturer-imposed price increase, retailers will pass through
100% of the increase to consumers. 18 This presumes that retail can be
"modeled as a perfectly competitive industry with constant marginal
costs."'19 Because retailers face imperfect competition from their
counterparts, they "often are able to exercise a degree of market
power." 20 Furthermore, retail giants like Macy's are no longer just
retailers; Macy's is a vertically integrated giant that produces
nineteen percent of its sales from store brands that it designs,
manufactures, and sells.2
1
The importance of department stores, however, is more than just
numbers reflecting industrial might. To fully appreciate the
ramifications of the Macy's/May merger, it is necessary to consider
department stores in context, including their historical development
and their role in the national fabric.
How Steiner's Theory Provides an Explanation of Important Regularities, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 911
(Winter 2004). See generally Robert L. Steiner, Marketing Productivity in Consumer Good Industries-
A Vertical Perspective, 42 J. MKT. 60, 61-63 (1978); Robert L. Steiner, A Dual-Stage View of the
Consumer Economy, 35 J. ECON. ISSUES 27 (2001).
15. Lynch, supra note 14, at 911.
16. Id. at 912.
17. Fortune Global 500, FORTUNE, 2006, available at http'//money.cnn.com/magazines/
fortune/global500/2006 (last visited Aug 17, 2008); Fortune Global 500, FORTUNE, 2005, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2005 (last visited Aug 17, 2008); Laurent Belsie,
Wal-Mart: World's Largest Company, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Feb. 19,2002, at 1.
18. Lynch, supra note 14, at 911, 915, 920-21.
19. Id. at921.
20. Harbour, supra note 14, at 987; Steiner, Vertical Restraints, supra note 14, at 157-58.
21. See http://www.macysinc.com/Investors/Financiallnformation/SalesByCategory.aspx (last
visited Feb. 15, 2010); Jennifer Steinhauer, Strutting Their Own Stuff, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1997, at
Dl.
20101
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B. The Beginnings
From small peddler outposts to ubiquitous suburban mall
landmarks, department stores have grown with America and at the
same time changed America. Indeed, the pervasiveness and success
of department stores today belies a remarkable history. Department
stores radically changed the rules that governed shopping for
hundreds of years.22 Peddlers of modest means, often Jewish
immigrants,23  became shopkeepers, and many built enormous
institutions over a few decades. The institutions they built were so
well received that, within a generation, these former peddlers and
members of ethnic and religious minorities were frequently accepted
into the upper crust of society.
24
Department stores made urban cores a focal point for city life,
rather than a dreary and austere collection of offices.25 And
department store buildings became symbols of urbanity and a central
fixture of community identity.
26
22. JOHN WILLIAM FERRY, A HISTORY OF THE DEPARTMENT STORE 3 (The Macmillan Co. 1960).
23. The founders of America's largest department stores were invariably of British ancestry, Jewish
dmigr~s escaping oppression in Germany and Eastern Europe, or descendants of Quaker families that
settled in New England in the 1600s. Id. at 23-24; see also JAN WHITAKER, SERVICE AND STYLE: HOW
THE AMERICAN DEPARTMENT STORE FASHIONED THE MIDDLE CLASS 184 (St. Martin's Press 2006).
24. See generally Bill Hendrick, Getting Past Prejudice; Lieberman Choice May Herald Decline in
Anti-Semitism, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 9, 2000, at ID; ISADORE BARMASH, MACY'S FOR SALE 30
(Weidenfeld & Nicholson 1989); WILLIAM LEACH, LAND OF DESIRE: MERCHANTS, POWER, AND THE
RISE OF A NEW AMERICAN CULTURE 117 (Pantheon Books 1993); Dave Simanoff, Maas Bros Store
Once Was Tampa, TAMPA TRIB., Apr. 11, 2006, Moneysense, at 1.
25. GUNTHER BARTH, CITY PEOPLE: THE RISE OF MODERN CITY CULTURE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 111, 147 (Oxford Univ. Press 1980).
26. THOMAS J. SCHLERETH, VICTORIAN AMERICA 146 (HarperPerennial 1992). Although there is
some dispute as to which department store was founded first (and some gradually transitioned from
small dry goods stores), many credit Bon March6 in Paris founded in 1852 by Aristide Boucicaut.
FERRY, supra note 22, at 2; ROBERT HENDRICKSON, THE GRAND EMPORIUMS: THE ILLUSTRATED
HISTORY OF AMERICA'S GREAT DEPARTMENT STORES 25-27 (Stein and Day 1979). Boucicaut's
department store was a revolutionary change in retail: customers were encouraged to browse without
any obligation to make a purchase; a money-back guarantee allowed shoppers to feel more secure in
their purchases; the merchandise was sold with a small mark-up, requiring rapid turnover to yield profit;
and goods were clearly marked with fixed prices and clerks were forbidden to haggle over the price.
HENDRICKSON, at 25-27. Other retailers made similar innovations around the same time and it is
difficult to determine who invented what first. Id. at 28. For example, Adam Gimbel introduced fixed
prices to his Vincennes, Indiana trading post in 1840; Potter Palmer (the original partner of Marshall
Field), R.H. Macy, and the founders of Strawbridge & Clothier in Philadelphia introduced cash
discounts long before their stores became department stores. Id.
[Vol. 26:2
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AN ANTITRUST QUANDARY
Most American department stores were founded between 1860 and
1910, and were a product of the industrial revolution.27 Americans
shifted from rural areas to urban centers and millions of immigrants
came to the United States.28 The increased density of population in
cities as well as advances in industrial production allowed department
stores to be created and flourish.2 9 Department stores gave textile
manufacturers a dependable outlet for their wares, and their heavy
advertising allowed city daily newspapers to grow and prosper.
30
Department stores in the United States democratized luxury.3' All
women were "ladies" to department store staff and the principal of
first-come-first-served allowed a servant to be waited upon before an
heiress. 32 Women aspiring to middle class comfort could find it
temporarily in this new downtown center of life, creating an illusion
of shared luxury between shoppers.33 Obsequious acts, such as
greeting shoppers, accepting returns, and treating all equally,
regardless of position in society, were elevated to the level of public
service, something highly regarded in a democratic society.
34
The principal cause of the stores' success is that their founders
understood that they were creating democratic and almost public
institutions for a newly industrialized society by satisfying consumer
hunger in the cheapest possible way, while at the same time
providing a taste for elegance and comfort unknown to previous
generations. 35 Thorstein Veblen called this democratic phenomenon
"pecuniary cannons of taste," meaning that all people were equal if
they had the money to acquire certain goods.
36
27. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 30-31; WHITAKER, supra note 23, at 1; LEACH, supra note 24,
at 16.
28. WHITAKER, supra note 23, at 1; HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 30-31.
29. BARTH, supra note 25, at 113; HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 31.
30. WHITAKER, supra note 23, at 137.
31. BARTH, supra note 25, at 115.
32. Id. at 123.
33. Id. at 130; see also JONATHAN RABAN, HUNTING MISTER HEARTBREAK: A DISCOVERY OF
AMERICA 51 (Harpercollins Publishers 1991); LEACH, supra note 24, at 20.
34. BARTH, surpa note 25, at 133.
35. SCHLERETH, supra note 26, at 149.
36. Id.; BARTH, supra note 25, at 133.
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Department stores became "meccas of consumerism and
materialism," pioneering the art of commercial displays and taking
advantage of new technology for larger, stronger, and clearer
windows, allowing pedestrians to shop without even entering a
37store. Like World's Fairs, another popular phenomenon of this era,
department stores used exciting interior designs, fashion shows,
holiday events, parades, fairs, and carnivals to sell merchandise. 38
Urban department stores even learned to commercialize Christmas39
and persuaded the federal government to move Thanksgiving one
week earlier in order to increase the time available for Christmas
shopping.4 °
By the late 1800s, a new world of retailing was created as
department stores created a new market position as universal
providers of substantially all goods. 41  The most prominent
department stores emerged from small peddler shops and became
some of America's largest businesses. Department stores required
new building materials because of their enormous size, glass
technology for giant display windows, and innovations in heating and
cooling systems for the comfort of customers, among other
architectural advancements. The store layouts made shopping easier
for consumers and allowed persons of different social and economic
backgrounds to mix. The department store also offered new customer
services never before seen such as restaurants, restrooms, reading
rooms, home delivery, wrapping services, late and dependable store
hours, new types of merchandise displays, and other improvements.
While owing a creative debt to the early pioneers of dry goods42
stores, John Wanamaker in Philadelphia, Marshall Field in Chicago,
37. SCHLERETH, supra note 26, at 148.
38. Id.
39. See id, at 144. To promote shopping, department stores resurrected dormant holidays and
invented new ones. Id. at 161.
40. Tim Feran, Lazarus Worthy of Loving Farewell, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 9, 2004, at IC;
Greg Saitz, Back to Black: The Legend of the Day After Thanksgiving, and How It Became the Main
Event for Retailers andHoliday Shoppers, NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, Nov. 27,2003, at 63.
41. See LEACH, supra note 24, at 23-24.
42. The term "dry goods" has long been associated with the items carried by department stores. See
HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 30. Dry goods stores take their name from the practice of early New
England merchants to sell "wet goods" or nun on one side of the store, and "dry goods" or bolts of
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and Rowland Hussey Macy in New York were the originators of the
American department store, creating enduring legacies that continue
to this day.43
C. Growth of the Early Department Stores
John Wanamaker opened his first store in Philadelphia in 1861.
44
What started as a small thirty-by-eighty foot shop became the largest
men's store in the city within seven years.45 As Wanamaker's
expanded over the years, its founder instituted some of the policies
for which he would be famous, including a complete satisfaction
guarantee on all items sold.46 Wanamaker's was not the first store to
institute a no-haggle pricing system, but it was the first to adopt the
system on such a large scale.
47
In 1876, Wanamaker opened his flagship store, portions of which
still stand today, albeit as a Macy's.48 On opening day, more than
seventy thousand people entered the store, which contained more
than three acres of retail space, 129 counters, 1,400 stools "for the
convenience of shoppers," stained glass skylights, and great gas
chandeliers. 49 This early store contained a version of the racetrack, or
circular pathway, design still used by most department stores today.5°
calico on the other side of store. Id. The term wet goods appears to have slipped from usage, but some
department stores and department store literature still refers to the items carried therein as dry goods.
See id.
43. Id. at 38, 61; SCHLERETH, supra note 26, at 147; Jane M. Von Bergen, Retail Revolution of His
Own: John Wanamaker's Stores Are Long Gone. But His Influence on American Shoppers Is
Incalculable, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Nov. 21, 1999. A.T. Stewart's "Cast-Iron Palace" opened in
New York City in 1862 and introduced to American shoppers the practices found at Paris' Bon March6,
including special attention to female customers, a fixed price policy with no haggling, departmentalized
stock, centralized management, an impressive physical structure, shopping amenities such as organ
music, and basement sales. John Wanamaker bought the Cast-Iron Palace from Stewart's beneficiary,
Judge Henry Hilton, in 1896. See generally FERRY, supra note 22; BARTH, supra note 25.
44. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 76.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 77.
47. HOWARD E. COVINGTON, JR., BELK: A CENTURY OF RETAIL LEADERSHIP 16 (Univ. of North
Carolina Press 1988).
48. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 78. Though the store was rebuilt in 1911, portions of the
original store remain, and the rebuilt store occupies the same location as the 1876 store. Id. at 79.
49. Id. at 78.
50. See id. at 78; see also generally Sway, RoxAnna, The Department Store: Headed for the Dustbin
or Ready to Re-Energize?, DISPLAY & DESIGN IDEAS, June 1, 2003, at 1.
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Grand openings like this became celebrated national events; when
Wanamaker rebuilt the store in 1911, President William Howard Taft
dedicated the store.
5 1
Wanamaker's innovations extended to employees as well. He
made cash payments to employees upon completion of their work;
hired women; gave half of Saturday off; instituted bonuses,
insurance, pensions, health and recreational facilities; and paid
competitive wages.
52
One of Wanamaker's peers was Marshall Field in Chicago.53
While Field created the world's first bargain-basement department
store, the downtown Chicago store was known as the "grandest of the
grand emporiums. ' 54 The store's south atrium, one of three in the
store, was designed and built by Louis Comfort Tiffany and includes
a glass mosaic covering 6,000 square feet.
55
Business was good for Marshall Field; when he died in 1906, he
left an estate worth more than $120 million-more than $2.6 billion
in today's dollars. 56 He endowed Chicago's natural history museum,
51. SCHLERETH, supra note 26, at 148.
52. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 80. Wanamaker was later appointed Postmaster General of the
United States. Id.; LEACH, supra note 24, at 116. One of his most important acts, which benefited
millions of Americans, as well as department stores, was to institute direct and free delivery of mail to
all homes in the United States in 1896. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 80, 210.
53. Unlike most of the merchant princes, Field did not start with a small cramped shop of his own.
HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 82; LLOYD WENDT & HERMAN KOGAN, GIVE THE LADY WHAT SHE
WANTS! 47-55, 62-64 (Rand McNally & Co. 1952). Potter Palmer, known as "The A.T. Stewart of the
West," sold his store to Field and a junior partner in 1868. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 83. Field
bought out his partner, Levi Leiter, in 1881. Id. at 86. The store grew bigger and stronger, despite the
brief setback of burning to the ground in Chicago's Great Fire of 1871. Id at 85. Field earned the loyalty
of his employees by posting a sign in the ruins of his store telling the staff where they could pick up
their pay. Id.
54. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 82. See also LEACH, supra note 24, at 27-28.
55. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 82. Some consider it the most architecturally significant
department store in the United States. David Moin, Vicki M. Young, Meredith Derby & Joanna Ramey,
Macy's Coast-to-Coast: Federated-May Deal Forges New Retail Giant, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Mar.
1, 2005, at 1. Field's also amassed an art collection, including Norman Rockwell's "The Clock Mender."
William Mullen, Times Heals Rift Over a Rockwell: Tiff Between 2 Retail Chains Comes to an End with
the Donation of the Painting 'The Clock Mender' to the Chicago History Museum, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27,
2006, Metro, at 3. When Macy's bought Marshall Field's it found that the famous painting was missing
and began a public argument with Target, the former owner, to get the painting back. Id Target finally
donated the painting to the Chicago History Museum. Id. See also LEACH, supra note 24, at 136-37.
56. U.S. Federal Reserve Bank for Minneapolis, What Is a Dollar Worth,
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/communityeducation/teacher/calc (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). See also
WENDT & KOGAN, supra note 53, at 257.
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which was renamed the Field Museum of Natural History, and also
donated the land that comprises the central core of the University of
Chicago campus.
57
Rowland Hussey ("R.H.") Macy was born on Nantucket Island to a
Quaker family in 1822.58 He left on a whaling ship at age fifteen and
returned with a red star tattooed on his hand-the red star that now
serves as the trademarked logo of Macy's, Inc.59 After whaling, Macy
tried careers in retail, the stock market, and real estate before opening
a store in Manhattan in 1858.60
R.H. Macy's small store was sixty feet deep with a twenty-foot
front and located on Sixth Avenue near Fourteenth Street.6 1 With no
money, he financed the store with loans of $20,000 and instituted the
basic policies Macy became known for: selling at fixed, marked
prices; selling at lower prices than other stores; buying and selling for
cash only; and advertising vigorously.62 The store was a success and
soon grew to occupy eleven storefronts.
63
Macy had little confidence in his son's business skills; instead, two
years after opening his store, Macy hired and came to depend on one
of the first women in American department stores, a distant relative
named Margaret Gretchell.64 When Macy died suddenly in 1877,
57. Id. at 176; AXEL MADSEN, THE MARSHALL FIELD'S 130-33 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2002); A
City Builds a University, U. OF CHI., http://www.lib.uchicago.edu/e/spcl/centcat/city/citychl_03.html
(last visited Aug. 17, 2008); Marshall Field Document, U. OF CHI., http://www.lib.
uchicago.edu/e/spcVcentcat/city/cityimg08.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
58. FERRY, supra note 22, at 55; HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 62.
59. Id. See generally L.H. Robbins, The City Department Store: The Evolution of 75 Years, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 12, 1933; Rob Lenihan, Federated Navigates Choppy Waters, THE STREET.COM,
http://www.thestreet.com/newsanalysis/retail/10343526.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2008); Macy and
Company, Inc., BRITANICA CONCISE, available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/355535/Macys (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). Over the course of its history, Macy's has sometimes
used a whale in its logo, or referred to promotion as a "whale of a sale," perhaps hearkening back to its
founder's early career. During the Cold War, Macy's was encouraged to drop the red star in the face of
criticism that it was a communist symbol; Macy's refused, suggesting it was a guiding star or a brilliant
star of hope. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 62-63; http://www.forgotten-ny.com/
SLICES/macy/macy.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
60. FERRY, supra note 22, at 56-57; HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 62.
61. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 63.
62. Id. at 63-64; FERRY, supra note 22, at 57. Macy's operated on a cash-only basis until 1939.
HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 64.
63. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 64.
64. Id. at 65; BARMASH, supra note 24, at 23; FERRY, supra note 22, at 57-58.
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Gretchell's husband and one of Macy's nephews acquired the store.65
Over the next few years, the store changed hands several times, each
time being purchased by another one of R.H. Macy's relatives. 66
The last of these Macy's family owners, Charles Webster, became
the sole owner of Macy's within a short period of time, but Webster
lacked experience and retailing knowledge.67 A few years before his
death, R.H. Macy leased the 2,500 square foot china department to
Lazarus Straus, a Jewish peddler who emigrated to the United States
from Germany in 1852.68 It became Macy's most profitable
department, with sales reaching twenty percent of the store's total.69
Webster offered Straus a partnership in 1887, and in 1896, Lazarus's
two sons, Isidore and Nathan, bought Webster out. 70 Although the
store still carries Macy's name today, Macy's was owned by the
Straus family for decades-far longer than it was owned by the Macy
family.
71
The Straus family achieved national prominence in that era. At the
same time they were consolidating their control over Macy's, Isidore
and Nathan were also taking over Brooklyn's grand department store,
Wechsler & Abraham, later renamed Abraham & Straus (or as
Brooklynites knew it, A&S).72
65. FERRY, supra note 22, at 57-58.
66. Id. at 58.
67. BARMASH, supra note 24, at 24. See generally HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 66.
68. BARMASH, supra note 24, at 24; FERRY, supra note 22, at 59.
69. BARMASH, supra note 24, at 25-26. See generally HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 66.
70. Id.; FERRY, supra note 22, at 59. Lazarus Straus died in 1888. BARMASH. supra note 24, at 27.
71. See generally BARMASH, supra note 24. Some have theorized that as long as the Straus family's
name was immortalized in one department store-Abraham & Straus-the family did not feel it
necessary to change the name of Macy's. Id. Abraham & Straus, however, was acquired by and renamed
Macy's in 1995. http://www.macysinc.com/AboutUs/History/MacysAHistory.aspx (last visited Feb. 15,
2010).
72. LEACH, supra note 24, at 25-26. Abraham Abraham was born in New York City in 1843 into a
Jewish family, and the son of a man who had emigrated from Germany. FERRY, supra note 22, at 64. He
left school at age fifteen to work in a Newark dry goods store along with Benjamin Altman (who
founded B. Altman's department store) and Lyman Bloomingdale (co-founder of Bloomingdale's). Id.
Wechsler sold his interest in Wechsler & Abraham in 1893 to the three Macy's partners, Isidore and
Nathan Straus, and Charles Webster, changing the name of the store to Abraham & Straus. Id. at 65. The
Strauses, separately, took over the A&S china department, as they had done at Macy's. Id; see
BARMASH, supra note 24, at 26-27. Other department store founders unofficially apprenticed at these
great stores; William Dillard worked at Wanamaker's in New York City while earning his MBA at
Columbia--that job, as well as visits to Macy's and Gimbels, provided him with examples of how
prosperous stores operated. LEON JOSEPH ROSENBERG, DILLARDS 7 (Univ. of Arkansas Press 1988).
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BAR ASH. supra note 24, at 26-27. ther depart ent store founders fficially a renticed t t s  
great stores; illia  i\lard orked at a a a er's i   r  it  ile rning   t 
olu bia-that job, as ell as isits t  's  irn l , r vided i  it  l s f o  
prosperous stores operated. LE  J SEP  SE E , I S  ( i . f r a sas ress 8). 
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Isidore died in 1912 while sailing on the maiden voyage of
Titanic,73  and Nathan continued to run the business. Although
Macy's went public in 1922, the Straus family continued to be
involved as investors, corporate officers, and directors until Macy's
was taken private in 1985. 74
Macy's flourished under Straus family control. In 1902, Macy's
moved uptown to Manhattan's Herald Square into a new nine-story
store featuring thirty-three elevators and four escalators. 75 The Herald
Square store cost $4.5 million, which was a huge sum at the time, but
the Straus family was considered such a good credit risk that neither
Macy's nor A&S had to be used as collateral for the loan.76 Additions
were made to Macy's so that by the early 1930s it occupied the entire
block from Broadway to Seventh Avenue, and from Thirty-Fourth
Street to Thirty-Third Street, making it the largest store in the
world.77
Macy's opened branches in Brooklyn and in the New York City
suburbs, and also acquired other department store chains in Toledo,
Ohio (1923); Atlanta (1924); New Jersey (1929); San Francisco
(1945); and Missouri (1947).78
Oscar Straus, Lazarus' youngest son, graduated from law school and was appointed ambassador to
Turkey by President Grover Cleveland-a controversial move because Oscar was Jewish. BARMASH,
supra note 24, at 29-30. In 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Oscar as Secretary of
Commerce and Labor; Oscar was the first Jew to be appointed to a cabinet position. BARMASH, supra
note 24, at 30.
73. Id. Isidore died along with his wife Ida. Id. Isidore refused to enter a lifeboat because there was
not enough room for women and children; Ida refused to go because she had been married to Isidore for
forty years and saw no reason to end it at that moment. Id. A plaque on the 13th floor of Macy's flagship
store in Manhattan commemorates their courage, and Straus Hall at Harvard memorializes them. Id.
Actors Lew Raven and Elsa Palter play Isidore and Ida in James Cameron's blockbuster film, TITANIC
(Paramount Pictures 1997). The Intemet Movie Database, Titanic, http://www.imdb.com/title/
tt0120338/fullcredits#cast (last visited Aug 17, 2008).
74. See BARMASH, supra note 24, at 19, 126, 132.
75. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 66.
76. BARMASH, supra note 24, at 28.
77. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 66-67. Macy's even won an antitrust lawsuit during this period.
Charging twenty to twenty-five percent less than publishers' advertised prices on books, Macy's was
accused by a book publishers' association of devaluing the copyright on the books it sold. Straus and
Straus v. Am. Publishers' Assoc., 231 U.S. 222, 229 (1913). Macy's prevailed in the Supreme Court, but
the struggle may have contributed to Macy's singular decision to develop private labels for merchandise
to give it greater pricing independence. See generally BARMASH, supra note 24, at 32.
78. Id.; HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 69.
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Wanamaker's, Field's, and Macy's were remarkable for their
success, growth, and longevity, but they were not alone. David May,
the founder of May Department Stores, emigrated to the United
States in 1863 with less than one dollar to his name.79 By 1914, May
owned department stores in Denver; Cleveland; Pittsburgh; Akron,
Ohio; and St. Louis.
80
Adam Gimbel, who founded the store across the street from
Macy's, was a German immigrant peddler who first opened a trading
post in Vincennes, Indiana. 81 His success led to stores in Milwaukee,
Philadelphia, and finally, in 1910, New York City.82 Gimbels was
sold to British American Tobacco in 1982, which shuttered the chain
in 1986. Many of the former Gimbels stores that remain standing are
now Macy's.
Morris Rich, a Jewish immigrant from Hungary, opened his first
store in Atlanta in 1867, just three years after General Sherman had
burned the city to the ground.83 At a time when caveat emptor ruled,
Rich's guaranteed customer satisfaction and treated customers with
southern hospitality. 84 Among many other contributions, the Rich
family endowed Emory University's business school.85 Although
Rich's had faced Macy's as a competitor from 1924 on, the Rich
family sold out to FDS in the 1970s, which, in 2003, combined the
Rich's and Macy's stores in Atlanta.86
Almost every city in America had a local department store that
contributed to its development and character. And some institutions
begun by department stores outlived the department stores
themselves. Dayton's department store of Minneapolis turned its
79. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 110.
80. LEACH, supra note 24, at 25.
81. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 71.
82. Id. at 72.
83. HENRY GIvENS BAKER, RICH'S OF ATLANTA: THE STORY OF A STORE, SINCE 1867, at 1, 11
(Univ. of Georgia 1953).
84. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 97.
85. Id. at 95-96. See also Goizueta Business School History, Emory University,
http://www.goizueta.emory.edu/aboutgoizueta/goizueta throughthedecades.html (last visited Aug. 17,
2008).
86. http://www.macysinc.com/AboutUs/History/1979.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2010);
http://www.macysinc.comAboutUs/History/present.aspx (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
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basement into the "Downstairs Store," which set out to be a "quality
discounter." 87 The "Downstairs Store" was eventually turned into a
separate and freestanding store that Dayton's called "Target."
88
Similarly, Filene's of Boston created the "Automatic Bargain
Basement" where prices were automatically reduced the longer items
remained in stock.89
Membership stores, well-represented today by Costco, B.J.'s
Wholesale Club, and Sam's Club, have their roots in the antitrust
laws enacted in part to combat the rising popularity of department
stores. In 1936, with a populist intent to punish all large department
stores because of their enormous power, Congress passed the Miller-
Tydings Act.90 Miller-Tydings allowed states to enact "fair trade"
legislation, effectively allowing individual states to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons. Co.,91 and allowing manufacturers to fix prices with retail
outlets.
92
87. LAURA ROWLEY, ON TARGET: HOW THE WORLD'S HOTTEST RETAILER HIT A BULL'S EYE 117
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2003).
88. Id. at 117-18. See also MARVIN TRAUB & TOM TEICHOLZ, LIKE No OTHER STORE... : THE
BLOOMINGDALE'S LEGEND AND THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN MARKETING 266 (Times
Book/Random House 1993). Dayton's continued in the department store business for many years,
acquiring Hudson's of Detroit and Marshall Field's, but the company eventually decided it had better
growth prospects with Target, changing the name of the corporation to "Target" and selling its
department stores to May. ROWLEY, supra note 87, at 117. Dayton Hudson was not the only store to
create a discount chain, although it may have been the most successful. Rich's created Richway,
Associated Dry Goods acquired Caldor, FDS created Gold Circle, and May created Venture. Id. See also
TRAUB, supra note 88, at 266-67. Richway, Caldor, and Gold Circle were liquidated during the
Campeau debacle and Venture ceased operations in the late 1990s in the face of heavy competition from
Target and Wal-Mart. Id.
89. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 129-30. Although Filene's Department Store is now owned by
Macy's, the basement store, now "Filene's Basement," was spun off as a separate entity during the
1980s and continues to operate independently. RVI - Filene's Basement, Retail Ventures, Inc.,
http://www.retailventuresinc.com/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 17, 2008);
http://www.retailventuresinc.com/PressReleases/2009/RVI FB DISPOSITION.pdf (last visited Feb. 15,
2010) (announcing RVI's disposal of Filene's Basement).
90. Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, tit. 8, 50 Stat. 673, 693 (1937).
91. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). In 1975, Congress passed
the Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat. 801, repealing Miller-Tydings,
and restoring the precedent established in Dr. Miles. In 2007, the Supreme Court overruled Dr. Miles.
Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); Mark D. Bauer, Whither Dr.
Miles?, 20 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1 (2007).
92. Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of
the Progressive Constitution, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1064-69 (2005).
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Miller-Tydings provided an exemption whereby stores that were
open only to members could in fact sell at a discount to the
manufacturer's suggested list price.93 E.J. Korvette's, the first of
many predecessors to today's Costco, opened in New York City in
1948. 94 Membership was not selective or even pricey: Korvette's
founder gave out free membership cards to anyone who asked.
95
D. Merger and Consolidation
While Wanamaker's and Gimbels operated in (respectively) two or
three cities, and Macy's and May acquired a few other department
store groups early on, most department stores remained local
operations. But from the beginning, the entrepreneurial merchant
princes recognized certain economies of scale could be achieved by
working cooperatively.
In 1916, A&S, Filene's, Dayton's, Emporium, Bullock's, Lazarus,
Hudson's, Strawbridge & Clothier, and eighteen other family-owned,
non-competitive department stores in different cities formed the
Retail Research Association, which was later renamed Associated
Merchandising Corporation. 96 These organizations conducted joint
market research and pooled buying.97 Additionally, A&S and Macy's
shared a buying office in Paris and made joint arrangements with
factories.
98
93. Miller-Tydings Act 693.
94. ROWLEY, supra note 87, at 115.
95. Id. The chain stores, such as Sears and Montgomery Ward, also did well in this period, but
followed a business model substantially different than the department stores. WHITAKER, supra note 23,
at 2-3. See MARK STEVENS, LIKE No OTHER STORE IN THE WORLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF
BLOOMINGDALE'S 164 (Thomas Y. Crowell, Publishers 1979); see also generally HENDRICKSON, supra
note 26, at 205-50. Until World War , Sears and Wards were solely catalog businesses, selling mostly
to customers in rural areas. Id. Even after opening retail stores, the chains rarely chose downtown
locations, had inventory managed centrally without any discretion given to store managers for local
tastes, and specialized in mass-produced goods rather than fashion or style. Id. It is unclear whether J.C.
Penney is part of the chain store group, the discount store group, or even the department store group;
Penney's has changed its marketing strategies many times.
96. FERRY, supra note 22, at 66, 140; ROWLEY, supra note 87, at 113; JOHN M. BURNHAM, A
VENTURE IN RETAILING, FEDERATED'S "FOLEY'S OF HOUSTON" BY MAX LEVINE, RETIRED CHAIRMAN
OF THE BOARD, FOLEY'S OF HOUSTON 29-30 (The University of Texas at Austin College of Business
Administration Foundation Oral Business History Project 1969).
97. Id.
98. FERRY, supra note 22, at 65.
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The department stores cherished local control and family
ownership, but also recognized that risks could be spread by
affiliating with other stores so the businesses were not entirely
dependent on the economy of a single city.99 Sharing ownership
responsibilities also reduced dependency on family succession where
a future generation might not have the talent or interest to run the
company. 100
In 1929, FDS was formed by the merger of Lazarus of Ohio, A&S,
and Filene's; Bloomingdale's was asked to join a few months later.' 01
FDS was originally created as "a loosely knit federation of largely
autonomous and quasi-independent retail entities." 10 2 The original
holding company controlled less than one hundred percent of the
stock of its constituent entities, and its purpose was not to control, but
to unify. 0 3 Over time, FDS centralized operations and acquired all of
the stock of the member department stores. 104 Headquarters was
moved from New York to Cincinnati-where it remains today-and
the company began expansion in the 1940s. 10 5 FDS allowed critical
decisions to be made locally, such as choosing fashions, but
centralized accounting and encouraged competition between the
divisions in different cities to produce the greatest revenue.1 0 6
Joining together, each FDS department store could create buying
strength, but by operating independently, each retained its distinct
character, so customer loyalty was to the store and not the chain.
10 7
An FDS stockholder publication stated the following:
Because the company founders felt that Federated should not
become a chain of identical stores with a common name and
common merchandise trying to appeal to a mythical common
99. BURNHAM, supra note 96, at 24-25.
100. Id. at 25.
101. TRAUB, supra note 88, at 41, 264.
102. STEVENS, supra note 95, at 163-65; FERRY, supra note 22, at 4, 66; TRAUB, supra note 88, at 41,
264; BURNHAM, supra note 96, at 31-33.
103. BURNHAM, supra note 96, at 29-30.
104. Id. at 33.
105. Id. at 33, 45-46.
106. Id. at 33-34, 37-38, 45-46. See STEVENS, supra note 95, at 168-69.
107. TRAUB, supra note 88, at 41,264.
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customer, new merchandising concepts have been developed and
tailored to the changing needs of the American consumer.
Operating control has remained at the local level where
management can closely relate to the needs of customers and
community. Federated believes that a corporation, like an
individual, has a duty to be an involved citizen in the
community. This is even more important for department stores.
By the very nature of their presenting total services, department
stores are involved with most of the major elements of society. °0
The FDS business structure was highly successful and copied by
other groups of department stores-each generally continuing some
local control, extending the founding family's involvement, and
making many merchandising decisions separately.
Allied Stores included many of the department stores not invited to
join FDS; the most significant of which was Jordan Marsh in
Boston. °9 May continued to acquire department stores but allowed
their local character to continue. Carter Hawley Hale (CHH) grew out
of a combination of stores in California; it later acquired Neiman
Marcus of Dallas, Wanamaker's, and other stores. Similarly,
Mercantile Stores (later acquired by Dillard's), Associated Dry
Goods (later acquired by May), and on a smaller scale, Boscov's,
Bon-Ton, Belk, and Proffitt's, followed the FDS model combining a
hodgepodge of family-owned department stores, creating economies
of scale, but decentralizing important management decisions. With
each holding company except Dillard's, department stores kept their
local name and much of their local character.
From the end of World War II until the 1980s, department stores
continued as they were, dealing with the rise of suburbs and malls
(and often the decline of downtowns), but almost invariably
profitable and locally focused. By the end of the nineteenth century,
there were 1,000 department stores; by 1950, there were 4,000 stores;
108. STEVENS, supra note 95, at 169.
109. BuRNHAM, supra note 96, at 32-33.
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and in 2002, there were 9,355 stores. 110 Conservative operations in
most department stores meant there was little debt, and the often
incredibly valuable downtown real estate was not leveraged. That led
directly to the most tragic event in the entire history of American
department stores.
E. Robert Campeau
A perfect storm of greed, lust for power, and a liberal Wall Street
regulatory scheme almost led to the end of the American department
store in the 1980s. Starting in 1985, one man, a Canadian named
Robert Campeau, with less than $200 million in assets, was able to
borrow $11 billion to purchase the majority of department stores in
the United States, plunging them into bankruptcy a short time
thereafter. In his wake, Campeau left these department stores-stores
with which he was unfamiliar until shortly before buying them-with
thousands of layoffs; a required bail-out and foreign ownership by
investment bank First Boston;11' the collapse of the junk bond
market, which depressed profits for all department stores (forced to
compete with near fire sale prices on merchandise sold by the
bankrupt Campeau department stores 1 2); and a big drop in print and
broadcast advertising (hurting newspapers and broadcast outlets). The
mess continued for years, resulting in the merger between FDS and
Macy's, as well as the permanent shuttering of flagship downtown
department stores in cities across the country, including: Atlanta,
113
110. Jean Palmieri, Retailing's Seismic Shifts; From the Wal-Mart Rollout to the Nationalization of
Macy 's, Retailing Has Undergone Dramatic Changes, NEWS REC (Los Angeles, CA), Apr. 24, 2006, at
98.
111. Sarah Bartlett, Reassurance by First Boston That It Is Financially Sound, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
1990, at 35; CS First Boston: As Many Names As a Russian Novel, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 3, 1990, at
90; Steven Greenhouse, Reviving a Humbled First Boston, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1991, at DI. First
Boston was acquired by Credit Suisse and is now known as CS First Boston. Id.
112. Carol J. Loomis, The Biggest Looniest Deal Ever, FORTUNE, June 18, 1990, at 48.
113. JOHN ROTHCHILD, GOING FOR BROKE: How ROBERT CAMPEAU BANKRUPTED THE RETAIL
INDUSTRY, JOLTED THE JUNK BOND MARKET, AND BROUGHT THE BOOMING EIGHTIES TO A CRASHING
HALT 264-65 (Simon & Schuster 1991); Melissa Levy, Who Exactly Is Federated Department Stores,
Inc.?, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 31, 2004, at ID.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 273 2009-2010
)  T RY 273 
,   i    
t  t    
i i l       
    
t  
. peau 
t   t 
l t      t 
 , i   
,    
    t  
     
 ,  t t  
    
     i   
t   111    
 t    
   ise  
  t  112);   
    t  
 r   
'  t  
t t r  i  cities across the country, including: Atlanta,l13 
.  l i ri, t ili 's i i  ift   t  l t    lization  
's, t ili  s r one tic ges,  c  , ,  
 
. r  rtl tt,   i t t  t   cial y , . . s  
, t ;  irst st :      i  l,  IST, . , , t 
; t  r , i i   l  i st t , . . i s, . , 1, 1.  
. 
. l 1. ,  t  l ,  
. J  I , oI   :       
I , J  Il  J   ,   Il  I  I I    I  
 -  ( i   t r ); li  ,  tl   rated t s, 
I . , I I   I .,  , , t 10. 
19
Bauer: Department Stores on Sale:  An Antitrust Quandary
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Boston, 1 4  Columbus," 5  Hartford," l6  Newark, 1 7  Los Angeles," 18
Memphis,119 Philadelphia, 12 1 Pittsburgh, 2  San Francisco, 122  St.
Petersburg, 123 Tampa, 124 and Washington, D.C. 125 Fortune Magazine
called it "The Biggest Looniest Deal Ever."'
' 26
114. Jenn Abelson, Shoppers Swarm Filene 's Clearance: But Even Amid This Retail Circus, Many
Voice Nostalgia and Sadness over the End of an Era, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 2006, available at
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/03/07/shoppers swarm_filenes-clearance.
115. Lazarus Timeline, WOSU-TV, http://www.wosu.org/archive/lazarus/timeline.php (last visited
Aug. 17, 2008); Business Editors, Downtown Columbus Lazarus-Macy's Store to Close in 2004; New
Downtown Location Will Not Be Pursued, Bus. WIRE, Oct. 17, 2003, available at
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mimOEIN/is 2003 Oct 17/ai_108988087 (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
116. Kirk Johnson, G.Fox to Close, Ending Retail Era, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1992, at 23.
117. Nat Bodian, The "Big 3" Department Stores: Their Life and Times, Old Newark Memories,
http://www.virtualnewarknj.com/memories/downtown/bodianbig3.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
118. Robinson's Department Store, S. CAL., http://www.usc.edu/dept/geography/la-walkingtour/
newdowntown/robinsons departmentstoreformer.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2008); Max Pierce,
Before the Mall: When Local Department Stores Ruled Los Angeles, LA DOWNTOWN NEWS ONLINE,
http://www.ladowntownnews.com/articles/2005/11/07/news/news06.txt (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
119. ROTHCHILD, supra note 112, at 264.
120. See generally Andrea Knox & Jane M. Von Bergen, Strawbridge: Why a Sale? For Smaller
Chains, It's Harder to Compete with Big Chains 'Power, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 31, 1996; Von
Bergen, supra note 43; Caroline E. Mayer, Woodies Wins Bidding for Wanamaker 's Stores, WASH.
POST, Nov. 5, 1986, at A16.
121. Randy Tucker & Ken Alltucker, Downtown Lazarus Last of its Kind: Retailer Announces Plan to
Close 5 Unprofitable Stores, CIN. ENQUIRER, Jan. 17, 2004, at Al.
122. Gavin Power, Retailer's Roots Trace Back to 1876, S.F. CHRONICLE, Nov. 19, 1994, at Al. See
also Gavin Power & Kenneth Howe, Shoppers Mourn End of Emporium Era, S.F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 16,
1995, at Al.
123. Mark Albright, Maas Bros. Pulls out of Downtown St. Petersburg, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug.
4, 1991, at lB.
124. Bernice Stengle, Maas Brothers to Close Downtown Tampa Store in 1989, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Jan. 31, 1987, at 14A.
125. See Rudolph A. Pyatt, Jr., Woodies Gets an Opportunity to Undo the Errors of an Era, WASH.
POST, Jan. 20, 1994, at DII [hereinafter Pyatt, Woodies]; Kara Swisher, Filene 's Basement to Open
Here, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1993 at Al; Lena H. Sun, Chicago Firm to Buy Raleighs, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 1988, at Al; Caroline E. Mayer, Raleigh's Completes Garfinckel's Deal, WASH. POST, Aug. 20,
1987, at BI; Rudolph A. Pyatt, Jr., Washington's Retailing Upheaval, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 1988, at
F5. "Woodies," as Woodward & Lothrop was affectionately known, was a profitable store acquired by
A. Alfred Taubman, a Detroit real estate developer, in 1984. Pyatt, Woodies, supra note 125. He
combined its operations with Wanamaker's in Philadelphia and borrowed heavily based on the value of
the store's real estate. Id. The store did not, however, entirely fade into history. Years later, Woodies's
shopping bags, with a scripted "W & L," were seen on The Drew Carey Show, which was set in a
fictional department store with the same initials, Winfred-Louder, in Cleveland. The Drew Carey Show
(Warner Bros. television broadcast 1995-2004). Art imitated life; during the nine seasons of the Drew
Carey Show, family-controlled Winfred-Louder was acquired by a department store holding company
and the big downtown Cleveland store was eventually closed, although in the show's last season,
winfredlouder.com, an internet retailer, was established. See generally The Drew Carey Show: Show
Description, Cast & Crew, http://tv.yahoo.confthe-drew-carey-show/show/64/castcrew;_
ylt=AjP6bO4TEQA6uGNIOi5x2v2So9EF (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). Despite less than "stellar"
profits, Macy's has elected to keep its downtown Cincinnati department store, adjacent to its corporate
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AN ANTITRUST QUANDARY
Three unrelated events began this debacle. First, as interest rates
dropped in the early 1980s, insurance and pension funds invested in
high-yield junk bonds, making it easier for corporate raiders to raise
capital to conquer new companies. 127 The old staid department stores,
with valuable real estate, steady profits, and intangibles like century
old household brand names, were very valuable, but unprepared for
the onslaught. 128 Second, an inside group of executives and directors
at Macy's took the store private. And third, Campeau, a successful
real estate developer, sought to expand his business holdings.
Although Campeau first considered purchasing a savings and loan or
an insurance company, he decided that "since he was in the mall
building business, it made sense to own retail companies whose
stores could rent space in his centers."'
129
F. Macy's Goes Private
Ed Finkelstein was a retail legend. After heading Macy's divisions
in New Jersey, California, and New York, he was named chairman
and chief executive officer of the entire company. Only twelve years
after Macy's ended a century long chain of Straus family leadership,
headquarters, open. Contra Tucker & Alltucker, supra note 121. This suggests that there is at least some
value to local ownership of department stores.
126. Loomis, supra note 112, at 48.
127. JEFFREY A. TRACHTENBERG, THE RAIN ON MACY'S PARADE: How GREED, AMBITION, AND
FOLLY RUINED AMERICA'S GREATEST STORE 27 (Random House 1996).
128. At least one author who has studied this era would argue that the merger, bankruptcies, and
consolidation of the national department stores began in 1984 when Limited Brands, owner of The
Limited, Victoria's Secret, Express, and other popular brands, attempted a hostile takeover of CHH
stores, owner of Neiman-Marcus, The Broadway, John Wanamaker's, and other major department
stores. See id, 26-27. The takeover bid failed but ended with the bankruptcy of CHH, the sale of John
Wanamaker's to Alfred Taubman, and the sale of The Broadway to Chicago billionaire Sam Zell.
Taubman combined Wanamaker's with Washington, D.C.'s Woodward & Lothrop, later putting both
into bankruptcy and shuttering the chains. Zell sold The Broadway to Federated, and Federated
converted them to Macy's and Bloomingdale's. Another larger merger occurred in 1986 when May
acquired Associated Dry Goods, which included Lord & Taylor, L.S. Ayre (Indiana), Joseph Home
(Pittsburgh), Hahne & Co. (New Jersey), and Robinson's (Los Angeles and St. Petersburg, FL). See
generally Eric Schmitt, May Stores Seek Associated Chain, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1986, at Al; Martha
Groves, May Discloses Sweetened Bid for Associated, L.A. TIMES, July 11, 1986, Part 4, at 1;
Associated, May Merger Talks Confirmed, CHI. TRIB., July 11, 1986, at C3; Martha Groves & Greg
Braxton, Merger of May, Associated Faces Grass-Roots Opposition, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1986, Part 4,
at 1.
129. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 97.
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Finkelstein repositioned Macy's to appeal to affluent consumers
wanting high fashion, not bargains. 130 The changes led to record sales
and earnings.131
Department stores were stable businesses with consistent-
although perhaps not earth-shattering-profits. But department store
companies, particularly in the older urban markets, owned incredibly
valuable real estate "often valued on their books at only a fraction of
true worth," and had little or no debt.
132
In 1985, Herbert and Robert Haft of the Dart Group separately
greenmailed both May and FDS, 133 making millions in profit.
134
Other targets of the Hafts, including Eckerd Drugs, Safeway, and
Stop & Shop supermarket chains, were forced to sell parts of their
companies to pay the enormous debt incurred in leveraged buyouts
designed to save the companies from the Hafts. "Safeway sold or
closed 300 stores and laid off 8,000 employees. Stop & Shop sold or
closed [thirty-seven] of its Bradlee's stores and laid off 5,000
jobs.,' 35
In April of 1985, Business Week predicted that Macy's would be a
target for a corporate raider or greenmailer. 136 Macy's was in a
dangerous situation and Finkelstein decided it was time to take the
company private. 13 7 "Using the company's own cash flow and assets
as collateral," 384 insiders invested a mere $17.5 million, and
borrowed almost $4 billion to buy Macy's, taking the company
130. Id. at 24.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 28; TRAUB, supra note 88, at 271. See also BARMASH, supra note 24, at 17.
133. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 27; ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 153. See also Rudolph
A. Pyatt, Jr., SEC Warnings Should Wake Up the Hafts, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1990, at F3.
134. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 27; Caroline E. Mayer, Hafts Turn Failure into Large
Profits, WASH. POST, July 12, 1987, at Al. In 1987, the Hafts made a run on Dayton Hudson stock,
eventually mounting a takeover bid. ROWLEY, supra note 87, at 162. The state of Minnesota passed a
law to make hostile takeovers of Minnesota companies more difficult, but the 1987 stock market crash
dissuaded the Hafts from their bid. Id. at 163-65.
135. Peter Carlson, Herbert Haft, Always Coming Up Aces, WASH. POST,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A99300-1989Augl3.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
136. Gene G. Marcial, Why Retailing Is Ripe for the Raiders, BuS. WK., Apr. 29, 1985, at 101. In
1985, there was $24 billion of leveraged buyouts, fives times as much as two years earlier. BARMASH,
supra note 24, at 102.
137. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 28. See BARMASH, supra note 24, at 3-4.
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private for the first time since 1922.138 The financing was
complicated with different instruments and collateral connected to
Citibank, Manufacturers Hanover Trust, Goldman Sachs, and
Prudential, among others.' 39 It would not be obvious until 1993 that
Prudential's one billion dollar investment secured by mortgages on
the department store's valuable urban real estate was the most
pivotal. 14
0
G. Campeau Buys Allied Stores
In March of 1986, Campeau began secretly buying shares of Allied
Stores through a dummy corporation. 14 1 Though the Campeau
Corporation was "quite profitable,"'142 only the leveraged-buyout
craze of the 1980s could have allowed Campeau Corporation, a real
estate firm with a market value of $200 million and fewer than one
thousand employees, to take on Allied.143 Allied Stores had a market
value of two billion dollars; twenty-four divisions, including Brooks
Brothers, Jordan Marsh, Bonwit Teller, Bon Marchd, and Stern's;
670 separate stores; and 70,000 employees. 144
By 1986, it was apparent that Campeau's raid on Allied required
an unrealistic rate of return that doomed it from the start. 145 But the
fees were too large to caution more prudent behavior. First Boston,
for example, stood to earn more than approximately $60 million in
fees for various services, not including interest and additional fees if
Allied had to be chopped up to pay off debt. 146 Eleven law firms and
sixteen banks were involved, each generating enormous fees. 147
138. Id. at vii, 19.
139. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 88-89.
140. Id. at 226.
141. ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 43.
142. Id. at 33.
143. Id. at 14, 28-29, 36-42.
144. Id. at 29. This entire series of events may have been caused simply by Campeau's desire to bring
a Brooks Brothers store into one of his Canadian shopping malls. See id. at 29, 93.
145. ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 115.
146. Id. at 99.
147. See id. at 105.
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Making the Campeau/Allied deal work, however, required a return
on investment of twelve percent.' 48 The best any division of Allied
had ever done was nine to 9.5 percent and the company average was
six to seven percent. 149 Campeau was forced to raise one billion
dollars almost immediately by selling sixteen of Allied's twenty-four
divisions, including Block's in Indianapolis, Donaldson's in
Minnesota, Joske's in Texas, and Bonwit Teller in New York. 150
H. Campeau Buys FDS
Although it was still unclear whether Campeau's purchase of
Allied would ever be profitable-and while various Allied divisions
were still on the market--Campeau decided it was time for another
major acquisition. 151 He was interested in acquiring May, but decided
to buy FDS. 152 Some at First Boston questioned the wisdom of being
involved in such a risky transaction, but Campeau was responsible
for half of the firm's 1986 and 1987 profits. 153 Though the other
banks that financed Campeau's acquisition of Allied were unwilling
148. Id at 116.
149. Id at 115.
150. Id at 121-123, 154 (quoting letter from FDS to shareholders). In the opening credits during the
first season of The Mary Tyler Moore Show (the opening sequence was changed in later seasons), it is
possible to see a Donaldson's sign as Mary Tyler Moore is tossing her hat in the air. The Mary Tyler
Moore Show (20th Century Fox television broadcast 1970-77). See generally The Mary Tyler Moore
Show--Overview, http://www.imdb.com/titlelttOO65314/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2009). At the right price,
Bonwit Teller could have been profitable, "but First Boston's job was to insure that [the buyer] wouldn't
pay the right price." ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 123. Bonwit Teller's new buyer placed the chain
into Chapter II and liquidated the franchise; Carson Pirie Scott, which bought Donaldson's at an
excessive price, took on too much debt to avoid being taken over Campeau and was another corporate
casualty. Id. at 125. Proffitt's (which later changed its corporate name to Sak's Fifth Avenue) bought
Carson Pirie Scott, later selling it to the Bon-Ton; Bon-Ton announced in 2006 that it would close
Carson Pirie Scott's downtown Chicago store, which is on the national historic register. Sandra Jones,
Flag of Change on State: Carson's Closing Historic Store; New Uses for Landmark Building, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 26, 2006, at Cl. Dillard's purchased the twenty-seven Joske's department stores, located
mostly in Texas. ROSENBERG, supra note 72, at 99. Because of the purchase of Joske's, the Texas
attorney general investigated Dillard's to determine whether it was attempting to monopolize the
department store market; the investigation was later dropped. Id
151. See ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 137. At the same time, the banks, law firms, investment
partners, and former executives were sharing more than $130 million in fees and severance packages,
while 3,500 Allied employees were being laid off. Id at 145-46.
152. Id at 138-40.
153. Id at 139.
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at first to extend themselves further, Security Pacific decided to take
the risk. 1
5 4
FDS's board immediately turned down Campeau's tender offer,' 5
5
but the company was now in play with multiple suitors.'5 6 Ohio, the
home of FDS, hastily passed an antitakeover bill, 157 but the bill was
quickly declared unconstitutional by a federal judge. 158 Campeau
raised his bid higher than the others interested in FDS, including
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., the Pritzker family of Chicago and
Dillard's Department Stores.
159
FDS instead tentatively agreed to sell itself to Macy's. 160 Macy's
had taken on considerable debt to go private, but some of that was
paid off, and a properly structured acquisition of FDS would have
resulted in considerable profit for Macy's executive and institutional
161
owners.
Macy's and Campeau began a bidding war; as the price went
higher and higher,' 62 Campeau's backers consoled themselves upon
reviewing the higher bids with the assumption that Macy's certainly
must have known what it was doing in offering to pay so much.
163
154. Id. at 140-41, 162-63. Although Security Pacific was later largely cut out of the deal in favor of
Citicorp, the terms included Security Pacific's paying Citibank and Manufacturers Hanover Trust the
entire balance of their Allied loans--each bank made more than $20 million in profits, its largest profit
on this type of loan ever. Id. at 142, 181. A sense of urgency was also created by the chance of an
antitakover statute under consideration in Federated's home jurisdiction of Delaware, and Donald
Trump's announcement to the Securities and Exchanges Commission that he intended to purchase up to
$15 million of Federated shares, perhaps to be used as greenmail. See id. at 147.
155. Id. at 153. See also TRAUB, supra note 88, at 270, 272. One reason that First Boston
enthusiastically went ahead with the hostile takeover attempt was because its star banker, Bruce
Wasserstein, left the firm in a disagreement over policies and opened his own shop. ROTHCHILD, supra
note 113, at 158. Unless First Boston could prove that it could do billion dollar deals without
Wasserstein, its future was questionable-and the only billion dollar deal on the horizon was working
with Campeau to acquire Federated. Id. at 159-60.
156. Id. at 165--66.
157. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.01 (1986), amended by Act of Nov. 22, 1986 (codified as
amended at Ohio Rev. Code § 1701.01 (2006)).
158. Campeau Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 735, 739 (S.D. Ohio 1988); CRFT Corp.
v. Federated Dep't Stores, 679 F. Supp. 731 (S.D. Ohio 1988); see ROTHc-ILD, supra note 113, at 166-
67.
159. ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 168; see TRAUB, supra note 88, at 275-76. An inside group at
Federated was also unsuccessful at putting together a management buyout. Id. at 274-75.
160. ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 179; see TRAUB, supra note 88, at 279-82.
161. ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 182.
162. TRAUB, supra note 88, at 282-84.
163. ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 183.
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The final compromise allowed Campeau to acquire FDS, with
Macy's acquiring three FDS divisions (Bullock's, Bullocks/Wilshire,
and I. Magnin-all West Coast stores) for just over one billion
dollars, with Macy's also receiving a $60 million dollar cash
settlement to pay its bankers and lawyers.164 Campeau also agreed to
lower debt and raise cash by selling two FDS department stores,
Foley's (founded in Houston) and Filene's (founded in Boston), to
May. 165 Campeau borrowed more than $6.5 billion dollars to pay for
Federated, in addition to the $3.6 billion he had borrowed to purchase
Allied.166 Advisors and bankers on all sides earned $350 million. 167
. Allied/FDS and Macy's Declare Bankruptcy
Because of the enormous debt incurred, Campeau's acquisition of
FDS was doomed from the start.168 Campeau paid more than $200
million for fees and charges to acquire FDS, which was more than the
entire chain earned in a year.169 In an industry traditionally focused
on outstanding customer service, 3,400 jobs were eliminated almost
immediately. 170 At first, the financial situation of the combined
Allied/FDS was blurred by layoffs and consolidation of certain
functions, but by 1989, it was clear the companies were doing
terribly. 171 In order to service the debt, the bankers had projected
profits at $740 million for the year, but reached only $372 million; at
the same time, interest on the debt incurred by Campeau was $516
million. 1
72
164. Id. at 186; TRAUB, supra note 88, at 284. The final deal was personally negotiated by Joseph
Flom of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom. Id.
165. Bryan Burrough, Jacquie McNish & Carol Hymowitz, Betting the Store: Campeau at Last Gets
Federated, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 1998.
166. Id.
167. TRAUB, supra note 88, at 284.
168. ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 203-05.
169. Id. at 205.
170. Id. at 210. Bloomingdale's, for example, was given thirty days notice to cut $50 to $60 million.
TRAUB, supra note 88, at 290. The cuts may have been counter-productive; for example, the cuts turned
Jordan Marsh from a profitable department store into a money loser. Id.
171. Loomis, supra note 112, at 48. For example, the deal was structured based on budget cuts and
gains in sales, but no banker had ever asked the heads of the department stores whether the projections
were realistic. TRAUB, supra note 88, at 293.
172. Loomis, supra note 112, at 48.
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By early 1990, the Campeau Corporation board of directors
stripped Robert Campeau of all authority and put FDS, Allied, and
sixty-five subsidiaries into Chapter 11 bankruptcy, after seventy-five
years of continuously solvent operations. 173 Vendors for the most part
continued shipping goods to Allied/FDS because they had essentially
no other purchasers for their goods. 1
74
Meanwhile, Macy's had trouble digesting the Bullock's,
Bullocks/Wilshire and I. Magnin acquisitions and began to struggle
under its debt as well. 175 Many executives resigned in the turmoil, 176
and in 1988, Macy's began to lose money. 177 Finally, in 1992, as a
consequence of Robert Campeau's buying spree, Macy's filed for
bankruptcy and Finkelstein was fired.178
J. FDS Buys Macy's
Although Macy's made progress in its bankruptcy proceedings, an
unexpected event changed everything in 1993. Prudential, which held
one billion dollars in mortgages on Macy's real estate, sold half of its
claim to FDS, 17 9  which had emerged from bankruptcy a year
earlier.180  FDS also received an option to purchase Prudential's
173. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Federated Department Stores, Inc., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 2075 (S.D. OH
1990); In re Campeau Corp. Cal., 1990 Bankr. LEXIS 1778 (N.D. Calif. 1990). Just before filing
bankruptcy, Campeau said to Marvin Traub, CEO and Chairman of Bloomingdale's, "Chapter Eleven is
a good thing because you can lay off all the people you want, pay reduced salaries with greater
incentives, and stop paying pensions." TRAUB, supra note 88, at 332. Today, Robert Campeau is in his
mid-80s and living on his savings in a rented townhouse in Ottawa, Ontario. Paul Waldie, Collected
Woes, CANADA GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 24, 2006, at 37; Paul Waldie, Fallen Titan Campeau in Bitter
Divorce Spat, CANADA GLOBE AND MAIL, Nov. 18, 2006, at Al. He is involved in a highly public
lawsuit demanding $25,000 (Canadian) per month from his former wife in spousal support. Id. lisa
Campeau, his ex-wife, maintains a website giving her side of the story, http://www.ilsa.at/ (last visited
Aug. 17, 2008).
174. See Loomis, supra note 112, at 48; ROTHCHILD, supra note 113, at 255; see generally TRAUB,
supra note 88, at 333.
175. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 127-28; see Kara Swisher, I. Magnin at White Flint Mall to
Close, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1992, at D10.
176. See, e.g., TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 135. Terry Lundgren, who resigned from Bullocks
Wilshire after it was acquired by Macy's, later became CEO of Federated after it acquired Macy's.
177. See, e.g., id. at 138.
178. Id. at 207, 213-16; TRAUB, supra note 88, at 338.
179. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 226. FDS had at this point consolidated all Allied operations
that it still owned into FDS. See American Retailing, ECONOMIST, Jan. 8, 1994, at 65.
180. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 197-98; Wade Lambert, Federated May Face Sharp Curbs
As a Major Creditor ofR.H. Macy, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 1994, at B5.
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remaining share at a later date-giving FDS ownership or control of
one billion dollars of Macy's, which had been valued by its board at
the time of its bankruptcy at two billion dollars.'81
FDS was in a no-lose position. Even if a merger did not occur,
FDS would end up owning a substantial part of Macy's.182 Finally, in
July of 1993, Macy's agreed to be acquired by FDS, just five years
after Macy's had almost purchased FDS. 183 The New York Attorney
General raised concerns that FDS/Macy's would own thirty-nine
department stores in the New York City metropolitan area and
consumer groups expressed fears about higher prices.' 84 But FDS
agreed to "attempt" to sell six department stores and that resolved the
state's antitrust concerns.' 
85
K The Industry Regroups; Macy's Buys May
In some respects, the department store industry never recovered
from the Campeau-related bankruptcies, cuts in service, and store
closures. 186 The "stores were boring, the service nonexistent and the
merchandise ubiquitous without being interesting."' 8 7  The
mainstream department stores lost sight of their customer: affluent
customers turned to luxury purveyors like Neiman Marcus,
Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue, and Bloomingdale's, while bargain
hunters found what they were looking for at Wal-Mart and Target.188
181. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 207.
182. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 228.
183. Id. at 231-32; Edward R. Silverman, Federated, Macy's Merger OK'D, NEWSDAY, Dec. 9, 1994,
at A63; see also Patrick M. Reilly & Laura Jereski, Macy, Federated Reach Accord in Merger Talks,
WALL ST. J., July 15, 1994, at A3.
184. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 232.
185. Id.; see also Margaret Webb Pressler, N.Y. Attorney General Challenges Macy's Deal, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 1994, at Fl; Edward R. Silverman, Sears Mulls Buying NY Stores from Federated,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 8, 1994, at A19; Edward R. Silverman, Federated Will Sell Six Stores, NEWSDAY, Sept.
20, 1994, at A33; Laura Bird, Macy Federated Plan Hits Snag in New York, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,
1994. The FTC took no action. Margaret Webb Pressler, FTC Will Not Block Merger Between
Federated, Macy's, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1994, at F1.
186. See, e.g., TRAUB, supra note 88, at 290. Deep cuts in operations at Jordan Marsh turned it from a
profitable department store into a money loser. Id.
187. Dody Tsiantar, Department-Store Superstar, TIME, Feb. 6, 2006. See also Loomis, supra note
112, at 48.
188. Tsiantar, supra note 187.
[Vol. 26:2
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 282 2009-2010
282 I   (  
i    
 
 it  r t  at t o billion dollars. 181 
 
  y's.182  
'    
 .183  
 l '   
  
 184  
  
 concerns. 185 
. t  ;  
   
 -r lated ,  
.1    t  
i    ti g." I 87  
i t  t    r: t 
t  t      , 
,  l 's, i  
 t t e  ere looking for at al- art and Target. 188 
. ,  ,  
. ,  t  ,  . 
183. Id. at - ; ar  . il nn , e erated. 's r r ' , Y, e . ,19 , 
at 63; see ls  atric  . ill   r  r i, , ted   i   l , 
 . ., l  IS, , t . 
. TENBERG,   ,  
. I .;  l  r r t  l , . . tt  l  ' , . 
, . , , t I  . il nn , Y rated, 
E S , ct. ,1 , at 19; d ard . il er a , ederated ill ell i  t r s, , t. 
, , at ; a ra ir , , r t d l  it   i   ,  . . , 
1994. he  t   ti . r r t  r l r,  ill t l   t  
e erated. acy 's, . , . , , t I. 
186. See, e.g., B, supra te , at .  ts i  r ti s t J r  rs  t r  it fr   
r fit l  rt t st r  i t    l r. I . 
187. ody si t r, e rt e t-Store rstar, i , . , .  l  i ,   
, t . 
. si t r, s r  t  . 
28
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol26/iss2/1
AN ANTITRUST QUANDARY
Macy's, for example, no longer had "its own feisty identity.
Instead, a new culture [was created], one that emphasized cost-
cutting, controls, and uniformity."' 8 9 Departments unique to Macy's
were closed or reduced in size and the store began to sell clothing
that could be found in dozens of chains across the country.
190
The Campeau-related bankruptcies may even be responsible, at
least in part, for the ascendancy of Wal-Mart and Target. It was only
after the these bankruptcies and consolidation of department stores
that "discount stores first made inroads in winning many popular
department store brand accounts, to which they would not have
ordinarily had access. This helped stoke the fires at Wal-Mart and
Target and helped catapult both retailers to their current leadership
positions."'
9 1
A tension existed between cost-cutting and business
rationalization, and making department stores desirable places to
shop. After Campeau, department stores stopped innovating and
launching new concepts. 192 Department stores historically had the
foresight, entrepreneurial spirit, and nerve to experiment and remain
relevant; Campeau sucked the "lifeblood" out of department stores,
forcing them to focus only on "better efficiencies and financial
streamlining."' 93 In recent years, department stores have become
imitators, not innovators, borrowing coffee shops from Starbucks;
cosmetics marketing from Sephora; store layouts, shopping carts, and
central checkout from Kohl's; and designer shops from Ralph
Lauren. 194 In fact, the current trend of department stores to turn over
considerable space to brands like Ralph Lauren makes it "a street
filled with boutiques," which resembles-and fails to distinguish
itself from-the mall itself. 195
189. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 127, at 236.
190. Id.
191. Sway, supra note 50, at 1.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Adam Gopnik, Under One Roof, NEW YORKER, Sept. 22, 2003, at 92.
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Retail Forward, 196 an industry consulting group, compiled a list of
consumers' complaints about department stores, which included
look-alike stores; inconvenient mall locations; time-consuming and
difficult to shop stores; shoddy service; no pricing credibility; and
loss of one-stop-shopping appeal. 197  Stores have discontinued
management training programs and terminated many layers of
executives, which may be contributing to a perceived decrease in
customer service-the area that distinguished department stores for
more than one hundred years. 1
98
Consolidation, however, continued. Dayton Hudson bought
Marshall Field's in 1990 and renamed all the Dayton stores in
Minnesota and Hudson stores in Michigan to Marshall Field's. 199 In
1998, Dillard's acquired Mercantile Stores, which had operated under
approximately thirteen local names.2 °0 In 2004, May bought Marshall
Field's from Target (the former Dayton Hudson) for $3.24 billion.20 1
In 2005, Bon-Ton acquired Carson Pirie Scott, Younkers,
Herberger's, Bergner's, and Boston Store from Saks Fifth Avenue
20 2
(which soon afterwards sold off Proffitts, McRae's, and the Parisian
stores not already sold to Bon-Ton, to Belk's).
May's 2004 purchase of Marshall Field's for $3.24 billion20 3
received considerable attention. Target had announced three months
196. Retail Forward, http://www.retailforward.com (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
197. Sway, supra note 50, at 1.
198. See id.
199. Jennifer Dixon, Marshall Field's Chain Sold to May in $3.2 Billion Deal, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
June 10, 2004, at IA. See Palmieri, supra note 110, at 98.
200. Dina Bunn, Dillard's Extends Offer to Purchase Joslin 's Stores, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Aug,
7, 1998, at 2B; Dillard's Acquisition of Mercantile OK'D, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Aug. 12, 1998, at
2B. A complicated swap was arranged with the FTC to satisfy antitrust concerns that included selling
twenty-six stores to May and Proffitt's (which later became Saks Fifth Avenue, and sold these stores to
Belk's).
201. Allyce Bess, May Co. Will Buy Marshall Field's, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, June 10, 2004, at
Al.
202. See Sandra Jones, Pleased with Growth, Carsons to Expand, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 22, 2006, at CI;
Dees Stribling, Saks Appeal, RETAILING TODAY, June 2006.
203. Bess, supra note 201. The transactions also included a "handful of Mervyn's stores." Id.
Mervyn's is a discount soft goods store with a format similar to J.C. Penney and Kohl's.
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earlier that its department stores were on the auction block, leading to
a bidding war between Macy's and May.
204
Some found the transaction "bewildering," suggesting that May
overpaid by as much as $1.5 billion.20 5 A year earlier, May had
announced the closing of thirty-two Lord & Taylor stores, many
operating in direct competition to Bloomingdale's and other Macy's
206stores. It is possible that May's closing of so many Lord & Taylor
stores was an effort to groom May for eventual sale to Macy's: May
made itself more enticing by buying Marshall Field's, which spoke to
Macy's geographic gap in the Midwest, and growing so large that it
was too big for Macy's to ignore. 207 May's closing of Lord & Taylor
stores in many markets where Macy's operated stores might have
been a reaction to declining business prospects, or could have been an
attempt to resolve potential FTC antitrust concerns before May put
itself up for sale.
Regardless of whether May intended to put itself up for sale when
it bought Marshall Field's, in 2005-just one year later-Macy's
acquired May for $17 billion.20 8
After a six month investigation, the FTC allowed the merger to
proceed as planned.20 9 Several state attorneys general, however,
determined that the merger between Macy's and May would hurt
competition and consumers through diminished choices and higher
prices. 2  The Attorneys General of California, Maryland,
204. Id; Dixon, supra note 199; Allyce Bess, May Co. Might Be Overpaying for Field's, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, June 11, 2004, at AO 1.
205. Allyce Bess, May Co. Might Be Overpaying for Field's, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 11,
2004, at AO1.
206. Sandra Jones, Lord & Taylor to Leave City, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 5, 2006, at Cl. See generally Dixon,
supra note 199.
207. See generally Christina Cheddar Berk, Federated Says Not Much Overlap with May Stores, Dow
JONES NEWSWRES, Feb. 28, 2005.
208. $11 billion was in cash and $6 billion was in Macy's stock. Daly, supra note 4; Moin supra note
55.
209. See, e.g., Stephanie Strom, FT.C. Ends Inquiry into Macy Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994, at
37; Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May Department
Stores Company, F.T.C. File No. 051-0111 at 1 (2005). See also FTC, Pre-Merger/Hart-Scott Rodino
Act, supra note 5; FTC, Current HSR Thresholds, supra note 5.
210. See Terence O'Hara, Federated Must Sell Stores to Rivals, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2005, at DI;
California Requires Spinoffs to Clear Federated-May Merger, 89 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. DAILY
258 (BNA), Sept. 2, 2005; Press Release, N.Y. St. Att'y Gen., Department Store Chain to Divest Three
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Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania mandated that Macy's
divest twenty-six duplicate stores in malls, and further required that
the stores could only be sold to traditional department store
companies, 211 even if Macy's received higher offers from other
parties.
212
New York's then Attorney General Eliot Spitzer said that the
divestiture agreement was necessary because otherwise Macy's
acquisition of May would end department store competition for some
consumers: 213 "[w]ith the divestitures, consumers will benefit from
lower prices, greater choice, and increased services that will result
from the competition generated by placing the divested department
stores under new ownership." 21 4 At least publicly, Macy's indicated
acquiescence to the divestiture; James Sluzewski, a spokesman for
Macy's, said that "the agreement with state antitrust regulators was
expected, given the large number of Macy's and Bloomingdale's
stores that overlap in malls with May stores."
215
In addition to ordered divestitures, Macy's chose to sell off an
additional eighty stores, or approximately twenty percent of the entire
May purchase.216 To increase geographic concentration, Macy's sold
to, or swapped locations with, other department stores, including
NY Stores As Part of Acquisition (Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.oag.state.ny.
us/press/2005/aug/aug3ObO5.html; Press Release, Mass. Att'y Gen., AGS Reach Multi-State Antitrust
Agreement Requiring Retail Rivals to Take Over Space Currently Occupied by Filene's and Macy's
(Aug. 30, 2005) (on file with author).
211. The traditional department stores acceptable to the attorneys general included Nordstrom,
Dillard's, Gottschalk's, Neiman Marcus, Saks Fifth Avenue, Sak's Department Store Group (which
included Parisian), Bon-Ton, Elder-Beerman, Boscov's, Belk and Von Maur. O'Hara, supra note 210.
212. See id; William T. Lifland & Elai Katz, Department Store Combination Scrutinized by States,
234 N.Y. L.J. 2 (Sept. 22, 2005); Assurance, State of New York, State of California, Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Maryland Against Federated Department
Stores, Inc. at 6, http://www.oag.state.ny.us/mediacenter/2005/aug/Federated 20Assurance.pdf (last
visited Aug. 17, 2008). Another copy of the Assurance can be found at
http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/cms05/05-071_Oa.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). The settlement required
only that the offers from traditional department store companies be "commercially reasonable." Id.
213. Press Release, N.Y. St. Att'y Gen., Department Store Chain to Divest Three NY Stores As Part
of Acquisition (Aug. 30, 2005), http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/aug/aug3ObO5.html.
214. Id.
215. O'Hara, supra note 210. Though Mr. Sluzewski's comment is interesting, it does not explain
why the FTC reached such a different conclusion after its own investigation.
216. Federated Announces Plan to Expand Macy's Brand in 2006; About 330 May Company Stores
to Convert to Macy's Nameplate Following Merger, Macy's Inc., Bus. WIRE, July 28, 2005,
http://www.macysinc.com/investors/maymerger/template/pressrelease.asp?item-id=736315.
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Boscov's and Belk.217 Macy's converted a few former May stores
into its upscale department store, Bloomingdales. 218 But the majority
of the closed department stores were sold to Target or back to the
mall owners. 219 Mall owners recognize that new department store
entry is unlikely and many of these former department stores were
turned into multi-tenant space, restaurants, food courts, movie
theaters, or sporting goods stores, perhaps permanently eliminating
the possibility of future department store entry and competition.2
20
Macy's also sold what remained of the Lord & Taylor chain to
NRDC, a private equity group, for just over one billion dollars.221
Lord & Taylor's flagship store in New York City by itself was valued
at $384 million dollars.222
L. Department Stores Today
In the past few years, there have been many attempts to label
department stores, particularly middle-market department stores such
217. Id; Federated to Exchange Stores with Belk, BUS. WIRE, Nov. 9, 2006, http://findarticies.com/p/
articles/mi_mOEIN/is_2006_Nov_9/ai n27046988; Shopping Centers Today, Boscov's Buys 10
Federated Stores, INT'L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING CENTERS, Feb. 6, 2006, http://www.icsc.org/srch/
apps/newsdsp.php?storyid=2103. Boscov, the last remaining large family owned department store,
declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy in August of 2008. Kim Leonard, Boscov's Closing Sales Begin Soon,
PITTSBURGH TRIB.-REV., Aug. 5, 2008. Boscov's acquisition of Macy's stores came at a bad time.
Because of the slow-down in the economy in 2008, compounded by the expense of buying so many
Macy's stores, Boscov's filed for bankruptcy in 2008. Id. After closing several stores, Boscov's intends,
however, to remain in business. Id.
218. Shopping Centers Today, Federated to Close Six More Stores, INT'L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING
CENTERS, Oct. 27, 2005, http://www.icsc.org/srch/apps/newsdsp.php?storyid=2030.
219. Shopping Centers Today, Federated Sells 4 Mall Anchor Stores to Target, INT'L COUNCIL OF
SHOPPING CENTERS, July 20, 2006, http://www.icsc.org/srch/apps/newsdsp.php?storyid=2213;
Shopping Centers Today, Simon Buys Back Nine Federated Stores, INT'L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING
CENTERS, May 2, 2006, http://www.icsc.orgtsrch/apps/newsdsp.php?storyid=2164. See also, e.g., Dana
Hedgpeth & Michael Barbaro, Shaking up Regional Retail, Federated-May Merger Likely to Bring
Closings, Reshuffling, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2005, at El.
220. Id.
221. Federated Finalizes Sale, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 4, 2006, at C2; Press Release, NRDC Equity Partners,
NRDC Completes Acquisition of Lord & Taylor (Oct. 3, 2006), http://www.nrdcequity.com/pdf/pr/
NRDCequityLandTacquisition.pdf; Press Release, NRDC Equity Partners, NRDC to Acquire Lord &
Taylor (June 22, 2006), http://www.nrdcequity.com/pdf/pr/nrdcacquiresLT 062206.pdf.
222. Sharon Edelson, With Federated-May Merger, Developers Eye L&T Flagship, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAILY, June 17, 2005. The same Wall Street analyst who valued Lord & Taylor's flagship at $384
million said "(t]here is no way the FTC will allow Federated to keep Macy's, Bloomingdale's and Lord
& Taylor .... Federated would become too dominant a presence." Id.
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as Macy's, as a dying breed.223 Some economists have suggested that
the under-one-roof convenience, the bailiwick of department stores,
is now pushing consumers desiring an easier and quicker shopping
experience towards specialty stores such as Gap and Limited.224
In 2008 and 2009, the American economy slowed and entered into
recession in substantially all sectors, largely related to difficulties in
the real estate market and related financial institution shake-outs. The
year 2007, after the Macy's/May merger but before the economy
slowed, may give a better indication of the strengths of retail and
department stores.
In 2007, department stores were alive and well, and doing better
than specialty stores. 225 In fact, it is the specialty stores that may be
the most endangered.226 "The great advantage the department store
has is the ability to quickly move from one brand to another to keep
itself fresh," said Stephen I. Sadove, chief executive of Saks; "[t]he
specialty store does not have that luxury."
227
During the past few years, Limited Brands, Inc. has sold off Lane
Bryant, Lerner New York, Abercrombie & Fitch, and Tween Brands,
and consolidated Structure and Express into one chain.228 In May of
2007, Limited announced that it would sell a majority interest in its
underperforming Express stores, and is considering options for its
Limited stores. 229 The goal of all these divestitures is to allow
223. Jeffrey A. Trachtengerg & Ann Zimmerman, Are Department Stores Dying? WALL ST. J.
(Classroom Edition), May 2002, http://www.wsjclassroomedition.com/archive/02may/
COVR department.htm.
224. Id
225. Michael Barbaro, Showing a New Style, Department Stores Surge, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2006, at
Al; Anne D'lnnocenzio, Retailers Post Weak April Sales, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 10, 2007),
available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/2007-05-10-1947799814_x.htm. See Sandra
Jones, Young Shoppers Buying into Department Store Makeovers, CHI. TRm.,Oct. 17, 2006, at CI; see
also generally Macy's Net Slips; Warning Issued, CHi. TRIm., Aug. 14, 2008, at C2.
226. Rachel Dodes, Style & Substance: Liz Clairborne's Unexpected Stumble-Buying Up Juicy
Couture, Lucky Jeans Wasn't Enough to Escape Industry Woes, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2007, at BI (Gap
closes Forthe & Towne chain).
227. Barbaro, supra note 225.
228. Limited to Sell Most of Express, CIN. POST, May 16, 2007, at BI 1; Reuters, Limited to Sell
Interest in a Unit and Explore the Sale of Another, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at CS; Bloomberg News,
Quarterly Profit Plunges at Limited Brands, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2005, at C3.
229. Id
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Limited Brands to focus on "intimate apparel, and personal care and
beauty.
230
In May of 2007, Gap, Inc., owner of Gap, Banana Republic, and
Old Navy, reported its seventh consecutive quarterly decline in
profits.231 Gap's chief executive was fired in January 2007 after a
third year of dismal holiday sales, and the chain is considering selling
itself.
232
During the past two years there has been a cooling of the retail
market, and that has included a decline in sales in most clothing
outlets.233 Some of this can be attributed to rising fuel prices and
other inflationary pressures, as well as a decrease in consumer
discretionary spending.234  Specialty retailers such as Gap,
Abercrombie & Fitch, and Limited have had a significant drop in
same-store sales. 235 Upscale department stores, however, such as
Saks Fifth Avenue and Nordstrom, posted substantial gains.
236
Although many department stores and specialty stores showed slower
growth or losses in 2007 as compared to 2006, the department stores
as a whole are doing no better or worse than specialty stores. 237 In
fact, Macy's did better than many of the most famous specialty
stores.
For example, Liz Claiborne, which operates retail stores under
several brand names and also sells to department stores, experienced
a sixty-five percent drop in profits from 2006 to 2007.238 During the
same period, Gap, which is planning on laying off as many as 3,000
employees, had a drop in same-store sales of sixteen percent, and
230. Id.
231. Bloomberg News, Ann Taylor and Gap Say Earnings Fell in the Quarter, N.Y. TIMEs, May 25,
2007, at C2.
232. Michael Barbaro & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Under Fire, Gap Chief Steps Down, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
23, 2007, at CI; Michael Barbaro & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Gap Is Said to Explore Selling Itself, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2007, at C 1.
233. Rachel Dodes, Style & Substance: Liz Clairborne's Unexpected Stumble-Buying Up Juicy
Couture, Lucky Jeans Wasn't Enough to Escape Industry Woes, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2007, at B 1.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Emily Fredrix, Kohl's, Penney, Nordstrom Profits Grow, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 17, 2007.
237. D'Innocenzio, supra note 225.
238. Dodes, supra note 233.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 289 2009-2010
]  I ST RY 289 
 l,   
t . ,,230 
 ,    
   
fitS?31   
t i    i l li  l ,  t  i  i  i i  lli  
.232 
  
   
  
  er 
 23  lt   
  t  
 ?35 t ,  
 a  ordstro , posted substantial gains?36 
 t  r 
t  
   
'    
 
,  
  
  ?  
 
,    
. 
   ings ll  rter, i S,  
 
. i l     i ,  ire,  i j t  , . . i , . 
,20 i l      lf,  
S ,2 I. 
 : l irborne's   
t re,  s 't   try  ,  I. 
. . 
d. 
.  . l' , ,  fits , s  , ,  
. 'l i , s r  t  . 
. ,   . 
35
Bauer: Department Stores on Sale:  An Antitrust Quandary
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Abercrombie & Fitch had a fifteen percent drop in same-store
sales.239
Fears of competition from Wal-Mart may have been exaggerated,
at least for now. Wal-Mart's attempt to sell better fashions and more
upscale clothing has been unsuccessful: 240 "[o]ne of Wal-Mart's main
problems is that its strategy to broaden its appeal to higher-income
shoppers with upscale merchandise was poorly executed. It filled its
fall clothing racks with too many trendy items like skinny jeans that
shoppers just didn't want." 241
Meanwhile, Macy's stock rose for most of 2007, with as much as a
forty-three percent increase in its share price from the time it
announced its merger with May in February 2005.242 "The merger is
not just going well," said Terry Lundgren, Macy's chief executive.
"It's going extremely well. 243 Such an outcome was in fact predicted
by two FTC economists, who studied May's earlier acquisition of
Associated Dry Goods and found that May experienced "positive
abnormal returns," suggesting the merger had lessened competition
and led to higher prices for consumers. 2
44
Same-store sales, for Macy's stores open at least one year and that
had not been part of May, were up more than seven percent for the
first part of 2007.245 In 2006, same-stores sales were up more than
246three-and-one-half percent. 6 Macy's has experienced difficulties
digesting the former May stores, but even with the May stores,
239. D'Innocenzio, supra note 225.
240. Sandra O'Loughlin, Research: Wal-Mart May Fashion a Comeback in Apparel, BRANDWEEK,
Apr. 2, 2007, available at http://www.allbusiness.com/marketing-advertising/branding-brand-
development/4675186-1.html; Wal-Mart Shuffles Chief Marketing Officer, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan.
24, 2007, available at http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/2007/01/24/WalMart-shuffles
chiefmarketingofficer/UPI-73631169661284; Parija B. Kavilanz, Corporate Branding Oops,
CNNMONEY.COM, Mar. 19, 2007, available at
http://wakeupwalmart.com/mews/article.htm?article=696 (last visited Oct. 13, 2009).
241. Anne D'Innocenzio, Wal-Mart Sales Decline; Report Contrasts with Rivals' Results, Alarms
Industry, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 1, 2006, at 3D.
242. Robert Berner, Is Federated As Flush As It Looks?, BUS. WK., May 28, 2007, at 71.
243. Id.
244. John David Simpson & David Hosken, Are Retailing Mergers Anticompetitive?: An Event Study
Analysis, http://www.fic.gov/be/workpapers/wp216.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
245. Bemer, supra note 242.
246. Barbaro, supra note at 225.
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Macy's experienced an overall increase in same-store sales of almost
one-half-of-one percent during the first part of 2007.247
In 2007, Macy's operating income as a percentage of net revenues
jumped sixty-four percent, up to more than four percent from two-
and-one-half percent in 2006.248 Some analysts suggested that
Macy's profitability took a hit from the inevitable difficulties of an
enormous corporate merger and consolidation, and predicted a three-
to-four percent increase in same-store sales, at least before the
economy slowed in all sectors.
249
Other department stores did well, too: Saks had same-store sales
increases of almost twelve percent and Nordstrom had an increase of
over three percent. 25  Sales rose almost seven percent at Neiman
Marcus and almost nine percent at Saks in the first three months of
2007.251 According to the chief executive of J.C. Penney, after four
decades of decline, "[t]he department store has become a destination
again.
'252
II. ANTITRUST FRAMEWORK
A. Background
For decades, courts and commentators have cited the Supreme
Court's admonition that the antitrust laws were enacted to protect
66 ,253
competition, not competitors. But according to Judge Robert
Bork-a major contributor to the doctrine of law and economics-
though "preservation of competition was often cited as the aim of the
247. Id.
248. Jeremy MacNealy, Will "M" Be a Moneymaker for Federated? MOTLEY FOOL, May 18, 2007,
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2007/05/18/will-m-be-a-money-maker-for-federated.aspx.
249. Federated Department Stores, Inc., STANDARD & POOR'S STOCK REP. (McGraw-Hill, Apr. 21,
2007).
250. D'Innocenzio, supra note 225.
251. Barbaro, supra note 225.
252. Id. After losing more than $900 million in 2003, J.C. Penney earned more than $1 billion in
2006. Id. It planned to open 28 new stores in 2007. Id.
253. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Brown Shoe
Co. v. U.S., 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
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law, there seemed no agreed definition of what, for the purposes of
antitrust, competition is."
254
Law and economics 2 55 offers a pro-market and largely anti-
government view of antitrust policy, 256 firmly rooted in neoclassical
price theory and with a Coasian257 assumption that minimizing
transaction costs will promote perfect (or near perfect)
competition.2 58 Law and economics informs that at least in the long
run, markets tend to correct their own imperfections. In fact,
government interference tends only to prolong the distortion or create
new imperfections. 259 And "court-ordered antitrust fixes actually
make markets less rather than more competitive, or injure consumers
for the benefit of competitors."
260
Markets dynamics aside, the concept of competition itself is less
clear. Some would argue that competition is about keeping prices low
for consumers;261 others suggest it is about consumer welfare, or
societal wealth maximization through allocative efficiency.262 Some
antitrust regimes support the notion of competition as a means of
protecting small businesses. 263 Others debunk the entire field, arguing
that law and economics-if not all of antitrust-is based on an
unrealistic economic model that compares the structure of existing
254. Id.
255. Law and economics is often referred to as the "Chicago School," because of its association with
the University of Chicago. See discussion supra note 7. According to Judge Bork, the books and articles
that transformed and infused antitrust with economics began at the University of Chicago Law School
and to a lesser extent, the Department of Economics and Graduate School of Business. ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 427 (Basic Books 1993). But see
Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257,
259 (2001) (noting that "[c]ontrary to common perception, the Chicago School was hardly the first time
that United States antitrust law confronted economic theory").
256. See generally id
257. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990).
258. Thomas L. Greaney, Chicago's Procrustean Bed: Applying Antitrust Law in Health Care, 71
ANTITRUST L.J. 857, 859 (2004).
259. Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 257, 269-70; Greaney, supra note 258, at 857, 860-61.
260. Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 257, 267.
261. Id
262. Id.
263. See ANDREW I. GAVIL, WILLIAM E. KOVACIC & JONATHAN B. BAKER, ANTITRUST LAW IN
PERSPECTIVE; CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN COMPETITION POLICY 31-32 (Thomson/West
2002); Julian Epstein, The Other Side of Harmony: Can Trade and Competition Laws Work Together in
the International Marketplace?, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 343, 360 (2002).
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markets with an arbitrary abstract and unattainable ideal of perfect
264
competition.
The question of whether department store mergers are (or can be)
anticompetitive raises these threshold questions and more. Most
schools of antitrust are fearful of coordination between businesses,
but differ on the odds of success for potential cartels. According to
law and economics, two or three firms can make a market
dynamically competitive; if that is insufficient, supra-competitive
pricing will be undermined by new entrants into the market. 265 post-
Chicago antitrust-an alternative, or perhaps complement to law and
economics266-believes that markets are "somewhat messier" than
law and economics claims, and that law and economics is less robust
in explaining all behavior that arises through competition, or lack
thereof.267  Post-Chicago antitrust is "fearful of strategic
anticompetitive behavior by dominant firms," and also believes that
government intervention can be successful.268
Although Macy's acquisition of May does not present the
opportunity to definitively resolve this long debate, the question of
whether the FTC correctly applied the relevant antitrust merger law
remains.
264. See generally Colin Camerer, Behavioral Economics, Past, Present & Future, in COLIN
CAMERER, GEORGE LOEWENSTEIN & MATHEW RABIN, ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2003);
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunsetein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavior Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Daniel Kahnemann & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory, An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979).
265. Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 257, 266.
266. GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 263, at 68. See Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 257, 258-
59.
267. Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 257, 258. See also Barry Wright Corp. v. IT Grinnell Corp.,
724 F.2d 227, 234 (1983) ("Nonetheless, while technical economic discussion helps to inform the
antitrust laws, those laws cannot precisely replicate the economists' (sometimes conflicting) views. For,
unlike economics, law is an administrative system the effects of which depend upon the content of rules
and precedents only as they are applied by judges and juries in courts and by lawyers advising their
clients. Rules that seek to embody every economic complexity and qualification may well, through the
vagaries of administration, prove counter-productive, undercutting the very economic ends they seek to
serve.").
268. Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 257, 267.
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B. Clayton § 7
Clayton § 7 empowers the government 269 to enjoin mergers whose
effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly., 270 This allows the government to challenge mergers
before they are consummated and lead to actual anticompetitive
effects, arresting mergers at a time when the trend towards a
lessening of competition in a line of commerce was still in its
incipiency.
Clayton § 7A, the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
of 1976 (HSR), requires parties to large mergers to notify the FTC
and United States Department of Justice (DOJ) (and supply
substantial amounts of information) before consummating the
transaction. 27 1 The adoption of HSR reflected a Congressional intent
to more aggressively block anticompetitive mergers through the
Clayton Act.
272
Horizontal combinations raise antitrust concerns when the merging
parties produce the same (or substitutable) products while competing
in the same geographic market.273 Both the FTC and DOJ dedicated
269. Private parties also may sue to enjoin a merger. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). Private parties would,
however, have a difficult time bringing a claim under Clayton § 7 before a merger, because only the
government is given access to confidential transaction materials and a waiting period before
consummation of the merger. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 7A).
Retrospective merger reviews may present few choices for an appropriate remedy because it would
require a court to "unscramble integrated business assets and activities." GAVIL, KoVACIC & BAKER,
supra note 263, at 420. See also Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 492-93.
270. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 7). As originally enacted, Clayton § 7 contained a
significant weakness by not attempting to regulate asset acquisitions or merger of firms that were not
direct competitors. In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act was passed to amend the Clayton Act and address
these issues. Pub. L. No. 81-899, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21
(1982 and Supp. V 1987)).
271. Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 589. See Introductory Guide I to the Premerger Notification
Program: What Is the Premerger Notification Program? FTC, http://www.ftc.govlbc/hsr/introguides/
guidel.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). The "size of person" and "size of transaction" tests were
increased to higher dollar amounts effective February 21, 2007. 72 Fed. Reg. 2692-93 (Jan. 22, 2007).
The tests are quite complicated, but, generally speaking, they capture transactions where one party has
assets in excess of $239.2 million, or one party has assets in excess of $119.6 million and the other party
has assets in excess of $12 million. Id; 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(aX2)(A)-(B).
272. ROSS, supra note 8, at 324-25.
273. Hovenkamp, supra note 256, at 492; Jonathan Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical
Overview, 74 ANTrrRUST L.J. 129, 129-30 (2007).
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substantial resources to examining horizontal mergers because it can
be a path to an oligopoly or monopoly.
274
In order to determine whether a merger raises horizontal concerns,
the government must determine the relevant product market,
275
although that may be the single most difficult task in all of antitrust.
"One reason is that the concept, even in the pristine formation of
economists, is deliberately an attempt to oversimplify-for working
purposes-the very complex interactions between a number of
differently situated buyers and sellers, each of whom in reality has
different costs, needs, and substitutes.
'
"
276
1. Product Markets and Submarkets
A relevant antitrust market under Clayton § 7 is one that includes
all firms making goods or services that consumers would consider
identical--or reasonable substitutes (considering the cross-elasticity
of demand)-sold within the trade area where consumers might
reasonably purchase the goods or services. This analysis, made by
studying industry dynamics, corporate documents, and customer
needs, leads to an estimate of the market share for each firm in the
relevant market. The market share data is then used to discern market
power and potential anticompetitive effects.
277
In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,278 the Supreme Court stated
that "[t]he outer boundaries of a market are determined by the
reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it."
279
The Court also held that within a broad product market, "well-
defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute
274. LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 575 (West Group 2000).
275. Id. at 575-76.
276. James A. Keyte, Market Definition and Differentiated Products: The Need for a Workable
Standard, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 697, 703 (1995). See also Dennis W. Carlton, Market Definition: Use and
Abuse, 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 1, 3 (2007).
277. Id.
278. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
279. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
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product markets for antitrust purposes." 280 Because Clayton § 7
created no single standard for defining a product market, the Court
directed that "practical indicia" be used, including industry or public
recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the
product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique product facilities,
distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and
specialized vendors.281 Examining the "practical indicia" in Brown
Shoe, the Court held that there were distinct submarkets for men's,
women's, and children's shoes, rather than just a broader market for
all shoes.282
It is possible that department stores are a submarket of a greater
clothing market, or home products market. Many goods sold in
department stores can be purchased elsewhere, but for more than one
hundred years, many consumers still continue to show a preference to
buy these products in department stores. This suggests at least some
consumer inelasticity of demand, or refusal to substitute products
(and distribution channels) that law and economics scholars might
find fungible.283 Indeed, many courts have found antitrust products
markets limited by the product's distribution channel.
284
280. Id. (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593-95 (1957) (there
are two du Pont antitrust cases in the mid-1950s, this case is usually referred to as "General Motors")).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 325-26. Since Brown Shoe, however, the concept of "practical indicia" has often been used
by courts erroneously, leading many commentators and other courts to be hostile to the concept of
submarkets. Baker, supra note 273, at 74. At least one Court of Appeals has asked litigants to avoid the
term submarket because of its misuse and complexity. Satellite Television & Associated Res., Inc. v.
Continental Cablevision of Va., Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 355, n.5 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027
(1984).
283. See F.T.C. v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 16562; F.T.C. v. Staples, Inc., 970
F. Supp. 1066, 1076-77 (D.D.C. 1997); Bon-Ton Stores, Inc. v. May Dep't Stores Co., 881 F. Supp.
860, 869-70 (W.D.N.Y. 1994); David J. Dadoun & Diana L. Dietrich, After Gillette: An Analysis of
Premium Product Markets Under the 1992 Merger Guidelines, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 567, 577
(1994). See also U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986, 992-97 (1Ith Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 512 U.S. 1221 (1994); Keyte, supra note 276, at 709, 712; Vitale v. Marlborough Gallery, 1994
WL 654494, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
284. See, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 1989) (separate product
market for supermarkets); Henry v. Chloride, Inc., 809 F.2d 1334, 1342 (8th Cir. 1987) (separate
product market for automotive battery sellers); Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 712
(7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980) (separate product market for drive-through film
processors); Bon-Ton Stores, 881 F. Supp. at 860 (separate product market for department stores).
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2. Cluster Markets
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank ("PNB"), the
Supreme Court-just one year after the Brown Shoe decision-
endorsed the concept of a cluster market:285 a market comprised of a
cluster of goods or services that could be purchased separately, save
for a consumer preference to buy them together.
In PNB, which concerned the merger of two banks, the Court
found that banks offered a cluster of services. 286 For example, banks
often offer mortgages, personal loans, checking accounts, savings
accounts, safe deposit boxes, and notary services. Consumers may
purchase each of these services separately, seeking out the cheapest
or best provider of each service.287 But most consumers turn to one
provider to bundle these separate services, even if better rates or
lower fees are available elsewhere. 288 The Court quoted a trial
witness who said:
There are four banks on the comer of Broad and Chestnut. Three
of them are commercial banks all offering 3 percent, and one is a
mutual savings bank offering 3 1/2. As far as I have been able to
discover, there isn't anybody in Philadelphia who will take the
trouble to walk across Broad Street to get 1/2 of 1 per cent more
interest. If you ask me why, I will say I do not know. Habit,
custom, personal relationships, convenience, doing all your
banking under one roof appear to be factors superior to changes
in the interest rate level.289
Though law and economics informs us that consumers will
rationally maximize wealth, the Coase theorem itself notes that
people will act to minimize transaction costs.290 In PNB, a "settled
285. 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963).
286. Id. at 357.
287. See id. at 326-27.
288. Id. at 357. When this case was decided, only commercial banks were permitted to offer checking
accounts. See id. at 326.
289. Id. at 357 n.34.
290. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of
the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. EcoN. 1325 (1990).
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consumer preference" insulated individual commercial banking
products from competition offering a better rate of return.291
Consumers see certain goods and services as complementary to one
another and seek to buy them together. In justifying them as a
separate antitrust product market, lower courts have applied this
concept to several industries, including department stores.292
3. Price Discrimination Markets
The U.S. Government Horizontal Merger Guidelines
("Guidelines"), jointly issued by the FTC and DOJ, disclose the
government's standards for evaluating mergers under Clayton § 7.293
Although an administrative guidance document, the Guidelines are
influential and routinely cited by courts considering mergers. 294
The Guidelines recognize "price discrimination," in which
businesses charge different prices to different buyers of the same
product.295 "The term price discrimination is applied when a [seller
can] raise price profitably to a class of targeted buyers,
notwithstanding the incentive of buyers to substitute to other products
291. 374 U.S. at 357.
292. ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE
ANTITRUST ISSUES 61-62 (2d ed. 2004). Cluster markets have also been used to challenge mergers
involving supermarkets, beauty products, office supplies, ammunition, rotary drills, marine engines,
industrial gasses and a variety of medical services. Id. at 62. See also Keyte, supra note 276, at 727;
Gregory J. Werden, The History of Antitrust Market Delineation, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 123, 166 (1992);
but see generally Baker, supra note 273, at 157-58 ("[C]luster market approach inappropriate for market
definition because clusters include products and services that are no demand (or supply substitutes).").
293. 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41, 552 (Sept. 10, 1992). The Guidelines were
revised in 1997 to update the policies on efficiency. See 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, FTC,
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/docs/horizmer.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). Earlier versions of government
merger guidelines were released by the DOJ in 1982 and the FTC in 1984. See Merger Guidelines, U.S.
Dep't Just., at n.4, http'//www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horizbook/0.htm (last visited Aug. 17,
2008).
294. See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045, 1053 (8th Cir. 1999); United States
v. Engelhard Corp., 126 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir 1997); United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp.
2d 1098, 1108 (N.D. Cal. 2004); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 322, 335 (S.D.N.Y.
2001); F.T.C. v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 1998); Darren Bush & Salvatore
Massa, Rethinking the Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 Wisc. L. REv. 1035, 1080 (2004); GAViL,
KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 263, at 455. But see Ronald Katz, Janet Arnold Hart & Theodore R.
Snyder, Courts Adopt a Practical Approach: A Post-Kodak Working Guide to Market Definition, 11
ANTITRUST 38, 39 (1997).
295. Baker, supra note 273, at 151.
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and more distant sellers .... ,,296 The sale of airline tickets is a
commonplace example of price discrimination. When buying airline
tickets, even passengers sitting adjacent to one another may pay
vastly different prices to fly on the same plane.
297
Hypothetically, department stores may find it possible to engage in
price discrimination. For example, as is common today, Macy's or
Dillard's may be the only middle-market department store in a mall,
city or other geographic market. 298 Such a middle market department
may revise its strategies to: a) price clothing for older, non-computer
savvy customers, at a supra-competitive level, if the only alternative
is making purchases on the internet; b) price business attire for busy
executives at supra-competitive levels, if the only alternative would
be to shop at one or more specialty stores (as opposed to the one stop
shopping available at a department store); c) price tailored clothing,
often difficult to find outside department stores, at supra-competitive
prices; and d) price gift items (such as those registered for weddings
and baby showers) at supra-competitive prices under the theory that
gift registries need to be accessible to friends and family across the
nation. 2
99
4. Anticompetitive Effects
Macy's and May merged in 2005 and at this time it is less
important to look at the antitrust theory behind the market definition
than to examine the anticompetitive effects that might have resulted.
An empirical study conducted as a companion to this article found
that Macy's customers are in fact paying more and receiving less.
300
296. Jonathan B. Baker, Stepping Out in an Old Brown Shoe: In Qualified Praise of Submarkets, 68
ANTITRUST L.J. 203, 207-08 (2000) (citing Horizontal Merger Guidelines at § 1. 12).
297. This alone is not an antitrust violation, because airlines are reacting to supply and demand.
298. This hypothesis would also be appropriate if there were more than one middle-market
department store and oligopolistic behavior, conscious parallelism, or collusion.
299. The challenge is charging a high price (and selling only to consumers who do not search other
stores), versus charging a low price (and potentially also selling to consumers that bargain hunt). See
Daniel S. Hosken & David Reiffen, Pricing Behavior of Multiproduct Retailers (June 2007), F.T.C.
Bureau of Economics Working Papers, Working Paper No. 225.
300. Mark D. Bauer, Give the Lady What She Wants - As Long As It's Macy's, 80 Temple L. Rev.
949, 1006 (Winter 2007); Michael Barbaro, Given Fewer Coupons to Clip, Bargain Hunters Snub
Macy's, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2007, at 1. See also Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated
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Before the merger, the FTC "conducted an exhaustive six-month
investigation," 30 1 and subsequently permitted Macy's to acquire May
without modification of the deal the parties suggested. Particularly
after considering the history of this industry, some of the FTC's
reasoning must be reconsidered.
III. FTC STATEMENT ON THE MACY'S/MAY MERGER
Although acknowledging that the Macy's/May merger would
"create by far the largest chain of so-called 'traditional' or
'conventional' department stores in the country," and that the merger
would create "high levels of concentration among conventional
department stores in many areas of the country," the FTC cleared
Macy's to acquire May.3
0 2
The FTC issued its Statement in accord with its policy "to help
provide transparency for decisions in high-visibility matters." 30 3 The
FTC recognized that "consumers mourn the gradual disappearance of
department stores in their hometowns," and that traditional
department stores "stock[ed] the kinds of merchandise best suited [to]
their personal tastes" as well as "provided a particular ambiance that
Department Stores, Inc./The May Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at 3 (FTC
2005).
301. Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Statement on Closure of Federated/May Investigation (Aug. 30,
2005), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2005/08/federatedmay.shtm.
302. Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May
Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at 1 (FTC 2005). The FTC "conducted an
exhaustive six-month investigation" following notification of the proposed merger and a second request.
ld; see also Briefs, FTC: WATCH (April 25, 2005); Letter from FTC to Phillip A. Proger, Esq., at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510001/0508301trfed051000l.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008); Letter
from FTC to Neal R. Stoll, Esq., available at http://www.flc.gov/os/caselist/
051000i/0508301trmayO5 10001 .pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
303. Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Statement on Closure of Federated/May Investigation (Aug. 30,
2005), http://www.flc.gov/opa/2005/08/federatedmay.shtm. On April i1, 1997, the FTC announced that
it would publicly acknowledge that a particular merger was being investigated under the Clayton Act
where a party to the transaction had disclosed its existence in a press release or other public filing.
Notice of Policy of Disclosing Investigations of Announced Mergers, 62 Fed. Reg. 18,630 (Apr. 16,
1997); FTC, FTC: Merger Acknowledgement, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/04/mergdisc.htm (last
visited Aug. 17, 2008).
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they found congenial," but in the end the FTC concluded the merger
would not have "any adverse effect on consumers."
304
An analysis of the FTC's more salient points follows below.
A. Suburban Malls Replaced Downtown Shopping
According to the FTC, "[flifty years ago, many individual
department stores were freestanding in cities, rather than suburban
malls, and they offered consumers the convenience of one-stop
shopping, particularly for home furnishings or clothing." 30 5 Today the
"overwhelming majority of department stores are located in some
one-thousand-two hundred enclosed suburban shopping malls" and
"malls have largely replaced flagship downtown department stores as
shopping destinations." 30 6 Because of this, the FTC said, the merger
of Macy's and May would not substantially reduce competition.
30 7
The FTC's statement is correct as far as it goes-the majority of
department stores are located today in suburban malls. The problem
is that metropolitan areas, which often include a plethora of shopping
malls, are not the relevant geographic market for all shoppers.
Approximately thirty million Americans live within the confines of
the country's twenty largest cities-not in the suburbs.
30 8
Approximately nine percent of American households-or thirty
million people-have no car. 3 0 9 Seventeen percent of elderly
American households have no car.
310
Presumably most car-less Americans are dependent upon public
transportation, which, if it exists at all, is designed to carry
commuters from far-off suburban locations and bring them into
304. Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May
Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at 5 (FTC 2005).
305. Id. at 2.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See Information Please Almanac, Top 50 Cities in the U.S. by Population and Rank (2005),
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0763098.htmi (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
309. U.S. Census Bureau, Population and Housing Narrative Profile: 2004,
http://factfmder.census.gov.servIet/NPTable?_bm=y&-geo-id=O1000US&-
qrname=ACS2004ESTGOONPOI&-ds_name=&-redoLog=false (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
310. Chapter 7: The Places People Live: Housing, 1999, U.S Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/population/pop-profile/1999/chapO7.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
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employment centers in urban cores, not to take city dwellers to
suburban shopping malls. 311 In at least two cities, perhaps perceiving
a risk of crime or as an attempt to keep inner-city minorities out,
suburban shopping malls have refused to allow buses from the city to
drop off passengers.
312
In Cincinnati, the corporate headquarters of Macy's, approximately
twenty-five percent of households have no car and are dependent
313
on the city's rudimentary bus system.314 While car-less Cincinnati
residents can enjoy the convenient downtown Macy's store, "[i]t's
true, we would not have built the store unless our headquarters were
here," said Carol Sanger, a Macy's spokesperson. 3 15 According to a
former Macy's chief executive:
I refer to the downtown ... store as enlightened philanthropy
.... It wasn't intended to be only philanthropic. But would we
have built it if our corporate headquarters had been somewhere
else? Probably not. We had a store here, we had a history here
and we thought we had a chance to do our part to help in the
development of downtown.316
Of course department stores are in the business to make a profit
and do not ordinarily keep stores open unless it makes business sense.
And having closed downtown stores in numerous cities, Macy's
apparently does not feel this obligation outside Cincinnati. But in
311. See generally Robert Byrd, Bias Seen in Opposition to Expanding South s 1st Rapid-Transit
Lines, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1989, at A34 (racism may be behind decision not to expand Atlanta's
subway lines); Kevin Collison, State Aid to Help NFTA Expand Suburban Mall Service, BUFFALO
NEWS, Aug. 16, 1996, at IB (state aid to help city residents reach shopping); Jean Grossman & Beth
Palubinsky, 'Bridges to Work' Can Change the Geography of Opportunity, DENV. POST, Aug. 27, 1995,
at H5 (difficult for urban residents to get to suburbs on bus); Stephen J. Lynton, Commuting Tough for
D.C. Poor, WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1985, at A25 (transit accessibility to suburbs poor).
312. Editorial, Mall Discrimination Is Outrageous, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 30, 1996, at 2B; Sabrina
Eaton, Public Transit Called Ticket to Jobs, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 17, 1997, at 3B.
313. Barry M. Horstman, Voters Say No to Higher Taxes: Proposed Light Rail System Loses Big, CIN.
POST, Nov. 6, 2002, at Al.
314. See Liz Oakes, Transit Meeting Feeling Gloomy, CIN. ENQUIRER, Dec. 7, 2003, at 2C.
315. Tucker & Alltucker, supra note 121.
316. Randy Tucker, Better Than It Was, CIN. ENQUIRER, Apr. 6, 2003, at ID.
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many cities, downtown stores are in fact profitable. 317 In other cities,
downtown stores were either close to profitable, or inconsistently
profitable, but the Campeau-related bankruptcies-which still haunt
many department stores because of deferred maintenance and upkeep
or the transfer of a local headquarters to a distant city-heralded the
closing of the downtown store.
318
The field of behavioral economics suggests that not all consumer
purchasing decisions are based on allocative efficiency and wealth
maximization. 319 A "consumer's willingness to pay in the real world
is skewed by a variety of biases and predictable misperceptions that
are also well understood by the seller."320 The typical consumer does
"not approach the marketplace with a series of predetermined
preferences, precisely and numerically weighted, seeking like a
computer algorithm the package of goods and services that
maximizes the fulfillment of their preferences at the lowest cost."
321
A department store appeals to a consumer sense of place, history,
ambience, service, support, tradition, and convenience. Even the FTC
agreed that at least some consumers are swayed by these factors.
322
In another departure from law and economics, not even all
business decisions are rational with the goal of maximizing profits.
For example, some businesses seem to fear the inner city and do not
wish to do business there, even though a substantial profit could be
made. 323 Some department store chains just do not care to understand
317. See Michael Barbaro, Retailers Finding a Market Downtown, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2004, at Al;
Steve Ginsberg, Nordstrom S.F.: Staying Hot; San Francisco, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Dec. 13, 1988,
at 1; LEACH, supra note 24, at 153.
318. See, e.g., Chris Burritt, Rich's Finally Bit the Bullet, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 18, 1991, at Cl.
319. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of
Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REv. 709, 754-57 (2006); HERBERT SIMON, A BEHAVIORAL
MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE, in MODELS OF MAN, SOCIAL AND RATIONAL: MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS
ON RATIONAL HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN A SOCIAL SETrING (1955); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded
Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003), available at
http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/contents/dec2003.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
320. Alan White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 144 (2007).
321. Id. at 18.
322. Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc.The May
Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at 5 (FTC 2005). The question remains as to
whether these consumer preferences serve to restrain prices for all consumers.
323. See James T. Madore, Urban Markets IIl Served, NEWSDAY, Jan. 20, 1999, at A8. See also May
Edwards & Bill Ryan, Challenges Facing Shopping Malls: Opportunities for Downtowns and
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the inner city and have no interest in doing business there.324
Dillard's, for example, does not operate a full service downtown store
in any city in the United States.
325
Inner cities, however, represent a retail market larger than that of
326Mexico--between eighty-five and one hundred billion a year. In
Cleveland alone, where Dillard's closed its historic but dilapidated
downtown store, hundreds of millions of dollars in retail spending
flows from the city to the suburbs every year.327 Shoppers might have
been more interested in spending money in downtown Cleveland's
last department store had the landmark building, which opened in
1931, been well-maintained: one year before it closed, the store had
red duct tape holding down the stained carpet, peeling paint, unlit
chandeliers, and a Santa Claus with "a busted eye, held together with
tape."
328
Businesses are apparently held back by the perception that inner
cities are unprofitable and unsafe places to do business.329 But
because of population density, inner cities can have more buying
power than an affluent suburb. 330 Target and Wal-Mart, which the
traditional department stores sometimes claim are their competitors,
Community Business Districts, U. WISC.-COOPERATIVE EXTENSION, CENTER FOR COMMUNITY ECON.
DEV., June 1998 No. 22, available at http://www.uwex.edu/ces/cced/downtowns/ltb/lets/lets698.htmi
(last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
324. See, e.g., Mya Frazier, Downtown Dillard's in Decline, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 16,
2001, at 2C.
325. Alison Grant, Mya Frazier & Marcia Pledger, Shoppers Say Farewell to Downtown Dillard's,
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al. Dillard's operated a store with limited offerings in a
portion of a historic department store building in downtown San Antonio, Texas, next to the Alamo, but
that store is now closed. Tricia Lynn Silver, Historic Joske's Building Purchased By Rivercenter Mall
Owners, http://www.bizjoumals.com/sanantonio/stories/2008/06/02/daily29.html (last visited February
9, 2009). See generally Mike Greenberg, Building Boom; Despite Growth, Much of San Antonio's
Downtown Retains Former Look Charm, SAN ANTONIO ExPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 28, 1999, at 3M.
Dillard's also operates a new store in Midtown Atlanta, on the fringes of Atlanta's central business
district, in an enormous new suburban style development. See Deborah Held Maslia, Atlantic Station
Shopping a Retail Rush for City, ATLANTA Bus. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2006,
http://atlanta.bizjournals.com/atlanta/stories/ 2006/03/06/focus7.html#.
326. Id.; Chris Reidy, Inner Cities'Retail Punch, BOSTON GLOBE, June 12, 1998, at Cl.
327. Sandra Clark, Developers Going Back to the Market Recapturing Sales Lost to Suburbs Is
Incentive for Inner-City Investment, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, Mar. 21, 1993, at 18A.
328. Frazier, supra note 324.
329. Reidy, supra note 326.
330. Id.
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have identified inner cities as areas for growth.331 Cities are often
willing to offer department stores substantial subsidies to open
downtown stores as activity generators.3 32 But with mergers resulting
in fewer department store companies, and some of the remaining
stores making a decision to avoid downtowns, there may be no
takers. Even without subsidies, "the cost to operate a store
[downtown] is much higher than in a suburban mall, [but] the payoff
can be far greater."
333
Department store companies, accustomed to the safety and ease of
operations at a greenfield suburban mall, may fundamentally
misjudge cities. For example, in downtown Washington, D.C., the
local May store, Hecht's, was profitable enough to justify $15 million
in improvements and renovations in 2004.334 Nonetheless, May
headquarters originally resisted when customers asked for higher-end
merchandise. 335 Apparently May executives relied on demographic
data for the relatively small downtown residential population, rather
than taking into account the large number of people who work, but do
not live, in downtown Washington. 336 "The way demographic data is
compiled, [the May executives at headquarters] could not appreciate
what was happening downtown," said a former Hecht's president and
chief executive.
337
331. See, e.g., Robert Manor, Wal-Mart Targeting Inner City for Buildup, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 5, 2006, at
CI; Lorraine Mirabella, Inner-City Centers a Good Investment; Rundown Retail Areas Draw Investors;
Money: The High Density of Inner-City Neighborhoods Is Making Them Good Targets for Retail
Development, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 13, 2005, at ID.
332. See, e.g., Barbaro, supra note 317 (Washington, D.C. offering up to $30 million); Jackie Crosby,
St. Paul Store Likely to Stay Open Until 2011, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., June 11, 2004, at 12A (St.
Paul gave $7.8 million in subsidies); Frazier, supra note 324 (Cincinnati gave $26 million in subsidies).
333. Pia Sarkar, Wes/ield San Francisco Centre; Fashionable Expansion; Bringing the Shoppers
Back to Downtowns, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 26, 2006, at El. See generally J.K. Wall & John Strauss, Centre
of Rebirth; The Mall Has Helped Transform the Culture and Economy of Downtown. But Will It
Continue to Thrive?, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 8, 2005, at IA.
334. Barbaro, supra note 317. The store itself was relatively new by downtown department store
standards; Hecht's had an older store in downtown Washington but sales justified building a new store
closer to the heart of downtown in 1980. ZACHARY M. SCHRAG, THE GREAT SOCIETY SUBWAY 205
(The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2006). See also Ylan Q. Mui, Era Ends With New Beginning;
Transformation from Hecht's to Macy's Will Be Completed Today, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2006, at Dl.
335. Barbaro, supra note 317.
336. Id.
337. Id.
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Despite the improvements to Hecht's (now Macy's) in downtown
Washington, $1.1 billion is spent annually by D.C. residents in the
suburbs.338 According to a recent study, the city's population and
income could support two additional department stores
downtown 33 9-a place that that is easily accessible by public
transportation 340 for the thirty-seven percent of D.C. residents that
have no car and cannot necessarily visit a suburban mall.341
B. Merger Will Not Affect Non-Price Competition
The FTC recognized that "many of the products now sold in
department stores-most particularly, women's apparel-have non-
price attributes that are also important to consumers." 342 FTC staff
reviewed documents obtained in its investigation to look for
"potential effects in non-price competition, e.g., reductions in
merchandise assortment or new product introductions, reductions in
store service and assistance, or reductions in store improvement and
innovations." 343 The FTC concluded that it "found no reason to
believe that [FDS] is likely to be able to reduce non-price
competition [as a result of its merger with May]." 3 "
Of course, precisely what the FTC found in its investigation will
remain a secret protected by the confidentiality requirements of
Clayton § 7A.345 But in reviewing the FTC's statement that there will
be no reduction in non-price competition, several important issues are
of concern.
338. Dana Hedgpeth, Downtown Could Support Big Stores, Study Finds, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2005,
at D4.
339. Id.
340. See generally Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, http://www.wmata.com (last
visited Aug. 17, 2008).
341. U.S. Department of Transportation, CTPP 2000 Status Report, http://www.thwa.dot.gov/ctpp/
srO103.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). Several Washington area suburban shopping malls are near
Metro subway stops, including Pentagon City, Wheaton Plaza, and Ballston Commons. These malls,
however, may be quite far from where the least affluent D.C. residents live.
342. Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May
Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at 4 (FTC 2005).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(h) (2000).
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1. Less Service
Customer satisfaction must be very important for a successful
retailer. 346 If Macy's faces as much competition as both Macy's and
the FTC claim, then, logically, it should have excellent customer
service to win over customers and keep them coming back. But
according to one widely reported metric, Macy's does not make the
list; in fact in recent years, Macy's only made the list in 2006, and
then perhaps only because it knocked Marshall Field's off the list by
buying it.34
7
The National Retail Federation and American Express in 2005
developed a survey to determine who provided the best customer
348service in a variety of areas. In order to keep the comparison fair,
the index was weighted by each company's 2004 sales, in order to
compensate for retailers' varying sizes or geographic market
coverage.349 According to the 2004 survey, Nordstrom was rated
number one for customer service among all retailers, and Marshall
Field's was rated number three. 350 The public results only reported
the top ten, so it is not known where Macy's fell on this list. In the
2006 survey, Macy's was ranked number ten and has not appeared on
the list again.
35 1
346. Cecily Hall & Emily Kaiser, Satisfied Shoppers, WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, Dec. 15, 2005, at 16.
347. Id.; see L.L.Bean Once Again Number One in Customer Service, According to NRF
Foundation/American Express Survey, National Retail Federation (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://nrf.com/modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&sp-id=653;
From Online Retailers to Department Stores, Best Retailers for Customer Service Run the Gamut,
National Retail Federation, http://www.nrf.conmcontent/default.asp?folder=press/
release2006&file=custserv1 106.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
348. Id.
349. Id. A total of 8,648 consumers were surveyed by BlGresearch; the methodology and results were
reviewed by Professor Martin P. Block, Ph.D of Northwestern University. Id.
350. Id. Nordstrom was noted for its long commitment to customer service; Marshall Field's was cited
for "fashion leadership, superb guest service and a commitment to community involvement." Id.
351. Id. Amazon.com was ranked number one in the 2006 survey; Nordstrom was ranked number
two. Id. Macy's has not been ranked since 2006. Other organizations conducting such surveys include
Business Week magazine (Nordstrom and Neiman Marcus were the only two department stores ranked
in the top fifty of all companies) and Corporate Research International (Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue,
and Bloomingdale's ranked as top three department stores. See The Customer Service Elite,
http://bwnt.businessweek.com/interactive-reports/customer-service (last visited Aug. 17, 2008);
Corporate Research International Reveals Best Customer Service, Market Wire, July 23, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease/idUS135334+23-Jul-2008+MW20080723.
20101
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 307 2009-2010
)  T ARY 307 
. i  
r ti    
346  '   ti  '   
t  
 
   
  
  
i  it. 347 
    
 i  r 
    
 '   
 rs'  i   
   
   ,  
'   t  
'   
 '   
li t again.351 
. il  ll  il  i , ji Shoppers, '   I , . ,   
. I .;  . .   i  r  i  t r r i , r i  t   
ti / erican r  , ti l t il ti  . , , 
l l s. hp?na e=News&0p=viewlive&sp_id=653; 
  ilers n e t s. t ilers r  t, 
l il / .nrf.co / t tldefault.asp?folder=pre s! 
06 file=custservII .  t  ,  
. 
. I .  t t l f8,  s rs r  s r   I r r ; t  t l   r lt  r  
r i   r f r rti  . l , .  f rt t r  i it . . 
. . t   t   it  l  it t t  t  i ; ll i l '   it  
 t t t.  . 
. I . .   r  r  i  t   ; tr     
t . . '   t   i  . t  i ti s ti    i l  
 t    t   
     i s)  t   ti l  
 '    t  
tt :// t. si ss eek.co linteractive_reports/customer_ service (l t i it  . , ); 
orate  I t ational l  t t er i , t i , l  , , 
t rs.co larticleipre sReleaselidUSI35 34+23-Jul-2 08+MW2 080723. 
53
Bauer: Department Stores on Sale:  An Antitrust Quandary
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Macy's may not even consider a high level of customer service to
be an attainable or desirable metric. Terry Lundgren, chief executive
officer of Macy's, apparently believes that top-notch customer
service is only appropriate at higher-end stores. He "bristles when
Macy's is compared with Nordstrom and its renowned customer
service." 352 "We're going to be known for affordable luxury," says
Lundgren. "That's something Nordstrom's could never say."
353
Lundgren's statements suggest that Macy's does not believe
excellent customer service is possible for a mid-priced store. This,
however, is at odds with the fact that Boscov, another middle-market
department store competing against Macy's in several mid-Atlantic
markets, was ranked sixth in 2006 and fifth in 2005, and Kohl's, a
discount clothing and housewares store similar to J.C. Penney, was
ranked seventh in 2008 and 2006, and fourth in 2005.
354
Macy's has had customer service problems for many years and has
acknowledged-Lundgren's recent remark not withstanding-a need
to improve.355 In Chicago, where there was at least a perception of
better customer service in the past (when Marshall Field's existed as
a separate brand), according to National Retail Federation/American
Express survey, customers "are increasingly bitter at what they see as
lower levels of merchandise and customer service at Macy's
compared with Field's.,
356
Despite a pledge by Macy's to make it easier to reach an operator
at its customer service number, customers now face "a confusing
352. Jayne O'Donnell, Beloved Stores Get a Lot More Than a New Name; Macy's Swoops in with Big
Changes to Field's, Hecht's, Others but a Few Old Touches Will Stay, USA TODAY, June 8, 2006, at
lB.
353. Id.
354. National Retail Federation, supra note 347. J.C. Penney did not make the list in 2005, but was
ranked number seven in 2006. It returned to the list, ranked number seven in 2009.
http://mf.com/modules.php?name=News&op=viewlive&spid=653 (last visited February 9, 2009).
355. See, e.g., Matthew Kauffman, Mall Competitors Roll out Welcome Mat for Nordstrom,
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 17, 1997, at Al; Tami Luhby, Convenience Counts As Macy's Moves In,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 13, 2001, at A42; Jennifer Steinhauer, Just Another Retail Bankruptcy? Maybe Not.,
N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1997, at Di; Andrea K. Walker, Retail Makeover; The Challenge for Macy's Is to
Keep Hecht 's Customers but Few Traditions, BALTIMORE SUN, Sept. 5, 2006, at IA; O'Donnell, supra
note 352.
356. Sandra Guy, Macy's Faces the Music: Shoppers Tuning out Since Name Change; Sears Outlook
Better, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at 50.
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array of menu options," and must enter their Social Security number
to speak to a live operator.357 According to Macy's, it is trying to
strike a balance between customer service and minimizing costs.
358
After acquiring May, Macy's cut at least 6,200 jobs, including
regional buyers. 359 Regional headquarters were eliminated in Boston,
Los Angeles, Houston, and Arlington, Virginia, for a total loss of
1,900 jobs. 360 One-thousand-seven hundred jobs were eliminated in
St. Louis, May's former headquarters. 36 1 In contrast, Chicago, whose
residents may have complained more vigorously than the residents of
any other city, lost only 250 jobs; in addition, Macy's tentatively
agreed to bring Frango Mint production back to the Chicago area
with a test kitchen in the flagship downtown store.362
In addition to services directly related to customer purchases-
including store hours, the number of employees available for
assistance, and brand selection--department stores have long been
known for community service. Specifically, department stores have
typically been large contributors to local philanthropy, sponsors of
community events and the host of a variety of in-store services not
conveniently found-if at all-elsewhere. 363 It remains to be seen
whether a corporation headquartered in a distant city with little local
management or control will be as charitable to local organizations.
From the first display windows that created the phenomenon of
window shopping,364 department stores have been a nexus of
community events that promote shopping, but also create value for
communities by hosting cherished local traditions. A full catalog of
these long-time practices would fill a book, but they include Jordan
357. Jolayne Houtz, Navigating the Phone Maze; Our New List of Automated-Phone-System Tricks
Just Might Get You to a Human Before You Hit the Wall, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 12, 2006, at MI.
358. Id.
359. David Moin, Terry Lundgren's Macro/Micro Game Plan for Federated, WOMEN'S WEAR
DAILY, Nov. 28, 2005, at 1.
360. Susan Chandler, Pain of a Name Change Cutting Deeper in Chicago, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2006, at
Cl.
361. Id. St. Louis retained other jobs because it was designated headquarters of Macy's Midwest. Id.
362. Id. Target had outsourced Frango Mint production to a company in Pennsylvania. Id.
363. See generally Jeffrey Sheban, For Many, It Was the Heart of the City, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,
Aug. 8, 2004, at IF.
364. SCHLERETH, supra note 26, at 148.
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Marsh's enchanted village in Boston;365 Rich's pink pig train3 66 and
the lighting of the tree on the crystal bridge in Atlanta;367 Burdine's
Circus in the Sky in Miami;368 Foley's Thanksgiving Day Parade in
Houston;369 local fireworks, Thanksgiving370 and Christmas parades,
and of course visits by Santa Claus. Most local traditions have now
been replaced by one Thanksgiving parade 371 and one Fourth of July
fireworks display,372 sponsored by Macy's in New York City, but
broadcast on national television. This cost-cutting is surely a
rationalization of services, but it suggests a decrease in service or
output, and an increase in price-paying the same or more but getting
less.
373
365. Matt Viser, Enchanted Village Is a Broken Spell, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29,2006, at lB.
366. See the Pink Pig at Macy's Lenox Square, Macy's, http://www.fds.com/
pressroom/macys/common/download.asp?fn=/pressroom/macys/media.kits/190/docs/ThePinkPigAt
_Macys.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008). After closing Rich's downtown store, FDS eliminated the pink
pig train in 1991. To meet community demands, Macy's created a brand new ride reminiscent of the
pink pig (the original was a monorail; the new pink pig is a children's ride on a short circular track)
running in a tent at Macy's Lenox Square Mall. See generally Susan Chandler, Pain of a Name Change
Cutting Deeper in Chicago, CHI. TRIB., June 4, 2006 at Cl; Macy's Pink Pig, Macy's,
http://www.macys.com/campaign/pinkpig/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 17, 2008); Priscilla the Pink Pig,
The New Georgia Encyclopedia, http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.orglnge/Multimedia.jsp?id=m-9324
(last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
367. M Rich and Brothers and Co. Building, City of Atlanta, http://apps.atlantaga.gov/
citydir/URBAN/MRich%20and%2OBrothers%20and%2OCo.htm (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
368. Robert Trigaux, Burdines Not Alone in Retail Boneyard, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005,
at ID.
369. See generally Thanksgiving Day Parade Loses Title Sponsor, HOUSTON BUS. J., Jan. 11, 2006,
http://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2006/01/09/daily26; Press Release, 57th Annual H-E-B
Holiday Parade Will Float Through the Streets of Downtown Houston on Thanksgiving Day: Themed
"Superheroes," the Parade Will Celebrate Both Favorite Fictional Characters and Everyday Superheroes
in the Greater Houston Community (Oct. 12, 2006), http://www.wamuparade.com/media/
HEB%20Parade%20General%2ORelease%2OFINAL.pdf.
370. Thanksgiving was moved to the third Thursday in November from the fourth Thursday by
President Franklin Roosevelt at the behest of chief executive of FDS, so the stores would have an extra
week of pre-Christmas shopping. Feran, supra note 40; Saitz, supra note 40.
371. Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, Macy's, http://www.macys.com/campaign/parade/ parade.jsp
(last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
372. Macy's Fourth of July, Macy's, http://wwwl.macys.com/campaign/sitelets/fireworks/
direction.jsp (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
373. Macy's has, however, agreed to continue certain local traditions, generally after the local
community has protested. See, e.g., Teresa F. Lindeman, Pittsburgh Traditions to Live on as
Kaufmann 's Stores Become Macy's, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, July 27, 2006, http://www.post-
gazette.con/pg/06208/708982-28.stm (Post-Thanksgiving parade, holiday windows and "Santaland");
Steve Tawa, Macy's Opens in Former John Wanamaker Store, KYW NEWSRADIO 1060 PHILADELPHIA,
http://www.kyw1060.con/pages/63717.php?contentType=4&contentld=181420 (last visited Aug. 17,
2008) (Wanamaker's Christmas Light Show in Philadelphia).
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2. Fewer Choices
The FTC "carefully reviewed the voluminous investigative record"
for indications that Macy's would "[reduce the] merchandise
assortment" and found none. 374 Again, despite the FTC's best efforts,
Macy's has defied predictions.
Even before Macy's eliminated the name Marshall Field's, Prada
pulled its product out of the former Marshall Field's stores.
375
Though Prada refused to comment, a retail consultant suggested that
"[h]igh-end brands only want to be in high-end stores, places that
they think are consistent with their brand image .... Perhaps some of
these designers don't feel that Macy's is the same level as Marshall
Field's. I think most customers don't, either."
376
Prada was only the first designer to jump ship. Also deciding not to
sell in Macy's were Miu Miu, Dsquared, Dolce & Gabanna (for
men), and Jimmy Choo.3 77 Elizabeth Arden pulled out of the
salons.378 YSL left Marshall Field's for Neiman Marcus.3 79 Prada,
David Yurman, and Gucci (shoes) went to Nordstrom. For the most
part, Macy's in-house brands have taken their place.38 °
Vendors, particularly smaller ones, fear Macy's enormous size,
perhaps even a monopsony in certain geographic markets. "There's a
huge portion of the vendor community that feels very threatened,"
according to an investment banker specializing in apparel.381 Not
only are vendors eliminated simply because of the consolidation of
374. Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May
Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051 -0111 at 4 (FTC 2005).
375. Allison Kaplan, High-End Prada Decides Macy's Isn't a Good Fit, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL
PIONEER PRESS, May 17, 2006, at IC.
376. Id.
377. Thomas Lee & Sara Glassman, The Uncertain Future of the American Department Store; With
the Switch to Macy's, Federated Has the Daunting Task of Wooing Core Marshall Field's Shoppers,
Who Still Care About Things Like Holiday Windows, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Sept. 3, 2006, at IA.
378. Id.
379. Sandra Jones, Field Days Here for Macy's Rivals; Other High-End Stores in the Area Were
Quick to Offer Space When Designers Loyal to Field's Were Displaced, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 28, 2007, at
Cl.
380. Sandra Jones, House Brands Heavy at Macy's; Federated Uses a Legion of Designers to Help
Set Its Clothes, Other Products Apart, Increase Profitability, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 8, 2006, at C1.
381. Merger Could Change Local Malls; Retail: Shoppers Unhappy About Macy's Owner's Buy of
Robinsons-May, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, Mar. 1, 2005, at Al.
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department stores, but smaller vendors simply cannot serve the larger
structure.
38 2
C. State Action Will Cure Possible Problems
One puzzling statement made by the FTC concerns remedial action
by other antitrust authorities. Specifically, in justifying the end of its
own investigation, the FTC said that "participation by state agencies,
which are familiar with specific local conditions, may be particularly
helpful ... and we also note that inquiries by various individual state
antitrust agencies are ongoing. ' '383 Effectively, the FTC was ceding
its authority to the states.
Every state can in theory pursue antitrust remedies in its capacity
as parens patriae under the federal antitrust law,384 and most states
can bring antitrust actions based on their respective "Little FTC
Act. 3 85 Many states have enacted specific antitrust laws patterned on
the federal Sherman and Clayton Acts.
In the Macy's/May merger, the Attorneys General of California,
Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania conducted
their own antitrust investigation and required Macy's to divest
twenty-six duplicate stores in malls, demanding that the stores could
only be sold to other traditional department stores. 386 But some states
refuse to bring antitrust suits claiming a lack of authority to do so. 3 8 7
For example, in 1998, Daryl Robinson, deputy counsel to then
Georgia Attorney General Thurbert Baker said, "[w]e do not have a
state antitrust law, and so don't have statutory authority to bring such
382. Id.
383. Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May
Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at 4 (FTC 2005).
384. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(f)-(g); California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989); Illinois
Brick Co., v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
385. See generally Mark D. Bauer, The Licensed Professional Exemption in Consumer Protection: At
Odds with Antitrust History and Precedent, 73 TENN. L. REV. 131, 140-47 (2006).
386. Assurance, State of New York, State of California, Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Maryland against Federated Department Stores, Inc.,
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/aug/Federated%2OAssurance.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
387. See, e.g., Jennifer Brett, Rich's, Macy's Can Stay at Mall but if Federated Sells Either Store, J.B.
White's May Consider Move, Company Spokesman Says, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 1, 1994, at B7;
Gene Tharpe, No Antitrust Law = No Antitrust Suit; But Why Not? Citing Lack of Authority, Georgia
Did Not Take Part in the Microsoft or Tobacco Cases, ATLANTA J. CONST., July 5, 1998, at 4G.
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actions[.] ... But having said that, if the federal government is filing
an antitrust suit, we will get the benefit of whatever relief they
get. 38
8
In Georgia, Rich's and Macy's consolidated during the Campeau
era (closing both downtown Atlanta stores), and the state was not
affected by Macy's acquisition of May. But states other than
California, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania
were impacted by this merger, and some of them may have been
relying on the FTC to take decisive action.
D. What the FTC Did Not Discuss: Entry Barriers, Monopsony And
Mall Owners
In trying to determine the effect of the Macy's/May merger on
non-price competition, the FTC interviewed interested vendors and
mall owners, viewing them as "particularly useful surrogates for
consumers." 389 The problem is that the interests of mall owners and
consumers may be at significant variance.
At first glance, mall owners' interests could conceivably be in line
with consumers. Mall owners have an interest in "maximizing
consumer traffic" 390 as well as keeping consumers happy and
interested (and coming back for more). At least in theory, mall
owners should prefer a large number of department-store companies
and brand names in order to have the maximum number of choices
for anchor stores, and even to have the maximum number of anchors
physically possible within the confines of the mall's real estate.
In fact, malls originally developed as long corridors connecting
two or more department-store anchors, whose aggressive advertising
brought ample traffic to the mall.39' In turn, department stores either
owned their anchor space or were given long-term leases requiring
388. Tharpe, supra note 387.
389. Statement of the Commission Concerning Federated Department Stores, Inc./The May
Department Stores Company, FTC File No. 051-0111 at4 (FTC 2005).
390. Id.
391. Andy Fixmer, Mall Owners Won't Lament Federated-May Deal: Sales Rise As Department
Stores Depart, L.A. Bus. J., Mar. 7, 2005, at 1.
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little or no rent, and mall owners made money renting space in
between the department stores.392
But the answer to whether mall owners and consumers have
identical interests is quite complicated today, and the FTC's reliance
on the opinion of mall owners may be misplaced. Shopping malls
have evolved from being relatively small or local efforts, often
substantially funded or owned by a local department store, to being
units in vast real-estate empires, often owned or controlled by Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REIT),393 which are often publicly owned
and traded on exchanges. As malls are traded and sold, their value
depends in part on the traffic, revenues, and the caliber of tenants.
Mall owners, therefore, have been substantially affected by both the
constant turmoil stemming from department store consolidation, as
well as the bankruptcies of Macy's, FDS, Allied, CHH, and others. 394
The financial stability and credit worthiness of a major anchor
affects the value of the mall itself.395 When a department store is
owned by a venture capital firm-as is true for Lord & Taylor since
its divestiture from Macy's in 2007-there is a perception among
shopping center owners that it will not be a stable long-term anchor
396tenant. All this instability affects the value of the shopping center,
and in turn the stock price or credit worthiness of the REIT.397
For example, Macerich Co., a REIT owning several shopping
malls,398 found itself with four anchors at The Oaks Mall in Thousand
Oaks, California, all owned by Macy's.399 Even worse, Macy's had to
divest some of these stores to comply with an agreement with the
California Attorney General, and there was no guarantee Macy's
392. Id; see also Sandra Jones, Water Tower Gets All Dolled Up, Boosts Sales; $35 Million in
Updates, Including New and Renovated Stores, Is Paying off for the Mall, Despite the Weakening
Economy, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 2008, at C1.
393. See generally Brannon Boswell, Merger Good for Mall Industry, Landlords Say, SHOPPING
CENTERS TODAY, Apr. 2005.
394. See generally Comment, Regional Mall REITs, MERRILL LYNCH, Nov. 24,2003.
395. See generally Jon Springer, Industry Weighs Implications of Grocery Mergers, SHOPPING
CENTER TODAY, Oct. 1999.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Macerich Co. Overview, http://www.macerich.com/overview.asp (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
399. Shelly Garcia, Breakthrough at the Oaks: Purchase of Center Anchors Will Speed Expansion
Plans, SAN FERNANDO VALLEY. Bus. J., June 5, 2006, at 1.
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would sell to any entity Macerich would want at the mall.4 °0
Macerich agreed to purchase two of the anchor department store
spaces from Macy's and plans to tear them down. 40 1 In place of one
of the Macy's stores, Macerich will add Nordstrom; the other space
will include smaller retail stores and, the REIT hopes, a movie
theater.40 2
Macerich is not alone in turning department store anchor space into
something else. In Phoenix, Westcor Partners turned three stories of
vacant department-store space into an MCI call center.40 3 At
Westfield Shoppingtown Wheaton, outside Washington, D.C., the
mall was anchored by both Hecht's (a former May brand) and
Macy's.4 04 The mall owners will buy the Hecht's store from Macy's
and try to remarket it to Best Buy or some other big box
40540discounter. These are just a few examples.40 6
It is possible that several factors are at work: 1) mall owners are
loathe to continue to see the value of their properties decline
overnight because department stores declare bankruptcy, consolidate
or close;407 2) mall owners have found that although they still cannot
live without at least some department stores,4°8 converting anchor
space into big box retailers (e.g. Best Buy or Barnes & Noble), movie
theaters, restaurants or other traffic generators will suffice; 40 9 and 3)
having gradually been weaned by department stores (whether by
400. Id. See Boswell, supra note 393; see also Assurance, State of New York, State of California,
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and State of Maryland against
Federated Department Stores, Inc., http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2005/aug/
Federated%20Assurance.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Anne Watson, Owners Finding New Uses for Old Centers, INT'L COUNCIL OF SHOPPING
CENTERS, May 2002, http://icsc.orglsrch/sct/sct502/page82.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2008).
404. Dana Hedgpeth and Michael Barbaro, Shaking Up Regional Retail; Federated-May Merger
Likely to Bring Closings, Reshuffling, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 2005, at El.
405. Id.
406. See also Fixmner, supra note 391; Debra Hazel, Check-in Time, SHOPPING CENTERS TODAY, Nov.
2003; Michael Sasso, Changes in Store for Malls, TAMPA TRIB., May 24,2006, at 1.
407. See generally Ben Johnson, The Future of the Department Store, RETAIL TRAFFIC, Aug. 1, 2002,
http://retailtrafficmag.com/mag/retail-futuredepartmentstore.
408. Id.; Boswell, supra note 393; Dody Tsiantar, Department-Store Superstar, TIME, Feb. 13, 2006.
409. Id.
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choice or circumstance), mall owners have come to enjoy the benefits
of owning anchor space and generating rents from them.
410
In the end, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines standard of entry
being "timely, likely, and sufficient '411 is not being facilitated by
mall owners tearing down empty department stores. Though new
entry remains possible-assuming there are any department store
companies left to take an anchor position-expansion increasingly
requires the construction of a new anchor building and potential
reconfiguration of the mall.
Macy's may be a monopsony in many geographic markets; mall
owners are doing their best to reduce dependence on an organization
with market power and in fact have other options for traffic-building
tenants. Consumers, however, may not be as fortunate, and the FTC's
reliance on mall owners as a proxy for consumer opinion may have
been misplaced.
Furthermore, when Macy's first announced its proposed
acquisition of May and antitrust concerns were raised in the media,
Macy's pointed out that the overlap between the department store
groups was limited to a few states. 4 12 This, however, discounts
theories of perceived potential competition (where the threat of entry
limits anticompetitive behavior by the incumbent firm)413 or actual
potential competition (where the incumbent acquires a firm that
would otherwise have entered the market and made it more
competitive).414 The FTC did not publicly disclose whether it
410. See Boswell, supra note 393; Fixiner, supra note 391; Jones, supra note 392; Mega-Mergers: It's
All About the Real Estate, 6 CO-STAR ADVISOR Issue 2 (on file with Georgia State University Law
Review) (hereinafter Mega-Mergers); see generally Garcia, supra note 399; David Koch, Anchors
Anew, RETAIL TRAFFIC, Dec. 1, 2004, http://retailtrafficmag.com/mag/retailanchorsanew/index.html;
411. U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines 3.0, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
horizbook/30.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
412. Berk, supra note 207.
413. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, 639-40 (1974); United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532-34, n.13 (1973); F.T.C. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S.
568, 581 (1967). See also GAVIL, KOVACIC & BAKER, supra note 263, at 453-54. See generally U.S.
Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1.0, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/ horizbook/l0.html (last
visited Oct. 23, 2009).
414. Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346, 353-54 (2d Cir. 1982); Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Bd. of
Governors, 638 F.2d 1255, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1981); BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977);
In re B.A.T. Industries, 104 F.T.C. 852, 916-48 (1984). See also GAVIL, KOVACiC & BAKER, supra note
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considered perceived potential competition or actual potential
competition. Unfortunately, it is not possible for even an interested
observer without the FTC's compulsory authority to hazard a guess
as to whether Macy's or May would have entered the other's
415geographic market were it not for the merger.
CONCLUSION
The perfect markets contemplated by law and economics predict
that consumers always maximize welfare by making efficient
choices. Yet something important is going on with department stores
that is not accurately reflected in a law and economics analysis.
These factors together have created a perfect storm of sorts that has
touched a nerve in many shoppers.
The experience of shoppers in Philadelphia is illustrative. In 1979,
after more than one hundred years of family involvement,
Wanamaker's was sold to California-based CHH,416 which had just
tried and failed to buy Marshall Field's (which had just tried and
failed to buy Wanamaker's.) 417 In 1986, after incurring considerable
debt to fight two hostile take-over attempts, CHH sold Wanamaker's
to real estate developer Alfred Taubman of Detroit, who had incurred
considerable debt a few years earlier acquiring Woodward & Lothrop
of Washington, D.C.4 18 Taubman converted most of the historic
Wanamaker's building in Center City Philadelphia into offices,
leaving a pared-down department store without most of its
departments. 419 All management and fashion buying decisions were
taken out of local Philadelphia hands and consolidated in
263, at 453-54. See generally U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines 1.0, http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/
public/guidelines/horizbook/l 0.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2009).
415. It is possible that because the FTC defined the market as going far beyond traditional department
stores that it did not consider theories of perceived potential competition or actual potential competition.
416. CHH eventually went bankrupt and was acquired by FDS. Diana B. Henriques & David Cay
Johnston, Managers Staying Dry As Corporations Sink, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1996, at Al.
417. HENDRICKSON, supra note 26, at 81; WHrrAKER, supra note 23, at 28-29.
418. WHrTAKER, supra note 23, at 28-29.
419. Id. See also Von Bergen, supra note 43.
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Washington, a city not generally known as one of the great fashion
capitols of the world.42°
Taubman put both Wanamaker's and Woodward & Lothrop into
bankruptcy in 1994 and then shuttered both chains. In 1995, May
purchased thirteen Wanamaker's stores, renaming all of them Hecht's
(a Baltimore/Washington regional department store).421 In 1996, May
acquired another Philadelphia department store, the family-owned
Strawbridge and Clothier, and renamed all the recently renamed
Philadelphia Hecht's stores as Strawbridge's, except for the original
Center City Wanamaker's store, which was recast as Lord &
422Taylor. When Macy's acquired May in 2005, it renamed all the
Strawbridge's stores (n~e Wanamaker's and n~e Hecht's) Macy's.
Then it closed the original Center City Strawbridge's store (doing
business on that site since 1868) and converted what was left of the
original Wanamaker's store from a Lord & Taylor into a Macy's.
Are these department stores retail "dinosaurs," as many
commentators have called them, or are customers simply
confused?423 The mere fact that department stores have generally
returned steady profits despite such upheavals is a testament to the
overall strength of the institution.
It is certainly possible that there was an oversupply of department
stores and some consolidation and rationalization of operations was
necessary for efficiency. It is also possible that a lax Wall Street
regulatory climate and hunger for junk bonds allowed profitable and
popular enterprises with valuable intangibles and real estate to be
chopped up for short-term profit and then swallowed by a sea of
debt.424
420. Id. See generally Unspoken Rule, Congress: Dressing for the Legislative Look, N.Y. TiMES, Apr.
26, 1984, at BI0; Fay Fiore, California Dreamy. Congressman Hunk, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1994, at A3.
42 !. WHITAKER, supra note 23, at 28-29.
422. Id; Gopnik, supra note 195.
423. See, e.g., Suzanne S. Brown, Meet the New Department Store, DENY. POST, Sept. 3, 2006, at LI;
Sandra Guy, Changes Aim To Save Tradition, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sept. 8, 2006, at 55; Sandra Jones, May-
Federated Merger Could Add to Overstock of Space; Expected to Shut 75-100 Stores Even as Other
Retailers Jettison Sites, CRAIN'S CI. Bus., Mar. 7, 2005, at 2; Lee & Glassman, supra note 377.
424. See Mega-Mergers, supra note 410.
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None of these changes, in Philadelphia and elsewhere, could
possibly have been good for business. They were short-term
decisions made for immediate profit, and to monetize real estate
assets; they were not good for the long-term profitability of
department stores and probably the reason the industry came to be
thought of as outdated and dying.
Antitrust has its roots in the same populist era in which department
stores arose. Department stores and the antitrust laws share common
origins and ideals of consumerism and democracy.425  The
subrogation of antitrust to the field of economics ignores its roots as a
"charter of freedom. ' 426
There is another side to antitrust: not every decision by consumers
is about buying the lowest-price good and maximizing allocative
efficiency. And putting the department stores on sale-rather than the
goods contained therein-has done nothing to improve competition,
innovation, or consumer choice.
Consumers not only care about service and ambience-Macy's
experience shows that consumers are also concerned by a
homogenization of retail choices, a loss of civic identity and at least
perceived disrespect by distant corporations that have usurped
cherished local institutions. These issues demand further
investigation by the FTC.427
425. See 51 CONG. REc. 11228, 11105, 11109, 14936 (1914) (statements of Sens. Robinson,
Cummings, Newlands and Rep. Stevens); Averitt, supra note 13, at 225, 230-31; Winerman, supra note
13, at 75-76, 90.
426. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,221 (1940).
427. The FTC has authorization to issue subpoenas to corporations whose business affects commerce.
15 U.S.C. § 46(b).
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